EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC ACTION IN THE CONTEXT OF NOVEL CHALLENGES RELATED TO GLOBAL CLIMATE MIGRATIONS

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Abstract

Civil wars in Darfur or Syria showed what the global effects of migration could be and proved the importance of creation of multi-stakeholder partnerships. The consensus is not easy to find but only a global partnership for the migration climatic challenge can create proper conditions for successful and sustainable action. The European Union should assume its leading role in establishing a universal approach of "climate migrations", based on its fundamental values: respect of human rights and global security. This article reviews the efforts to develop the understanding of the importance of global and cross-organisational involvement regarding migration in the context of climate changes. It highlights the initial effort to regulate and define the concepts of migration and refugees' seekers by international organisations. More specifically, the article concentrates on more recent efforts to formulate common actions and policies crossing the European Union borders and passing by the international organisations and NGO's involved in this matter.

Keywords: migration, novel challenges, global, border

Introduction

In the new context related to the growing importance of climate change issues it is important that the European Union be prepared to identify efficient solutions in the field of "migration diplomacy". Migration matters are linked to other areas of state interest and diplomacy, including security, economic, identity, soft power, and public diplomacy. Among other aspects, the future of the EU's external actions will be focused on cross-border population movement. The migrant crisis of 2015 was the starting point of what is commonly known as "the refugees and migrant crisis" (EP, 2015; EC, 2017). In a foreseeable future, climate changes and the lack of efficient public policies to counteract the new challenges in the countries of origin of migrants will generate new migratory and refugees' flows directed towards the European Union (EP, 2018). By facing these new challenges

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the European institutions will be constrained to re-design their action and to create new policies linking foreign relations and population mobility.

EU strategies and policies in external actions need to be directed towards an increase of legal protection, but also to work on the cross-border conflicts topics. The states and the law governance ought to put forward realistic host-state policies for climate refugees and migrants, be it for members of the diaspora(s), internal migrants or climate migrants. The same vision must be adopted at national and supranational levels by the EU member states. Climate migration and migration diplomacy are two of EU's major future challenges. Migration diplomacy describes "the states' use of diplomatic tools, processes, and procedures to manage cross-border population mobility" (Thiollet, 2011). Globalization processes have diminished and illegitimated states' sovereignty in issues related to migration, and revealed the importance of new international actors' action and engagement in matters beyond the reach of national states' authorities.

The topic of climate refugees and migration will create a new potential of cooperation between public and private institutions but also between national states and international organizations that will highlight the aspects related to cross-border mobility management at international level. Conflicts, violence, natural disasters and climate changes are already producing multiple and complex challenges for the cooperation in the field of security, law enforcement, irregular migration control, protection of migrants and refugees. The European Union has an important role to play in order to regulate a realistic supranational migrant policy and to promote respect of international agreements in a context of novel challenges generated by climate migration.

One of the fundamental issues is the apparent difficulty of defining specific concepts. Environmental refugees or climatic migration can be voluntary, involuntary, temporary, permanent, internal, cross-border but it can also be caused by multiple forms of problems: conflicts, wars, natural disasters, etc. The dilemma is to find an international migration and refugees regime which responds to the increasingly climatic challenge and create an emergent proactive and supranational process. Finding solutions for this problem was complex in the 1950's, with the creation of refugees and asylum seekers protection's parameters in the post-World-War II period, but it is not an easy endeavour in the actual context neither. Multilateral cooperation is usually not the first option neither it is the initial response to this emergent problem. In the field of the climatic migration a multitude of actors are playing key roles aimed at defining multilateral arrangements.

Furthermore, ethical aspects and respect of human rights are of key importance when approaching topics related to migration, in a classical sense (Hudson, 1984; Hing, 2006; O'Neil, 1984). The novel challenges related to migrations generated by climate change bear a new load of ethical and moral aspects that need to be discussed and understood in order to identify an efficient approach for the consequences of this complex yet ever growing phenomenon.

1. The definition dilemma of migration concept and patterns in the context of climate challenge

Academic research and developments related to policy debate on the link between climate (or, in a larger sense, environment) change and migration patterns are at present hindered by a number of structural difficulties. Among these, the most evident by its omnipresence and bearing heavy consequences over the reported findings and the proposed solutions is the conceptual discussion on the "correct" and "most adequate" terms to be used when addressing the categories of persons who undertake migration paths attributed (directly or indirectly) to climate (environment) change. The term "environmental refugees" was first used in a 1985 United Nations Environmental Program report, to define "people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of life" (El-Hinnawi, 1985). A decade later, a similarly broad definition was given by Myers and Kent, who referred to environmental refugees as to "persons who can no longer gain a secure livelihood in their traditional homelands because of environmental factors of unusual scope, notably drought, desertification, deforestation, soil erosion, water shortages and climate change, also natural disasters such as cyclones, storm surges and floods" (Myers and Kent, 1995). In an attempt to restrict the concept by referring merely to "climate refugees" who are seen as victims of a set of largely undisputed climate change impacts, Biermann and Boas gave yet another definition, in 2010: "climate refugees … are people who have to leave their habitats, immediately or in the near future, because of sudden or gradual alterations in their natural environment related to at least one of three impacts of climate change: sea-level rise, extreme weather events and drought and water scarcity" (Biermann and Boas, 2010). This definition stems out of a detailed analysis of the causes leading to displacement of persons that can be attributed to climate change, as well as of the types of migration: voluntary/involuntary, temporary/permanent, internal/cross-border. A 2011 Foresight report on the ways in which migration patterns are influenced by changing environment states that environmentally induced migration usually refers to "any people who are forced to move, temporarily or permanently, within or beyond the borders of their country of origin, due to a sudden onset of disaster or gradual environmental degradation" (Foresight, 2011).

Either restricting their assumptions and thus basing their definitions on the narrower concept of climate change, or speaking in a broader manner about evolutions of the global environment, researchers seem to agree that there is no universal definition of environmentally induced migration (Biermann and Boas, 2010; Maertens and Baillat, 2017). The use of the term "refugee" in relation to persons undergoing displacement as a result of climate (or, in a broader sense, environmental) change has been heavily criticised over the past decades. For some

researchers, the figure of climate refugee is analytically flawed, normatively problematic and legally impracticable (Bettini *et al.*, 2016). Nonetheless, the use of this term poses an inherent question of responsibility thus leading to the consideration of the issue of climate justice. For others, associating persons displaced as a result of a disturbed environment to the concept of "refugees" is positive, due to the term's strong moral connotation closely linked to empath and societal protection, in most world cultures and religions (Biermann and Boas, 2010). Introducing the notion of (human) rights into the debate over environmentally induced migration phenomena is facilitated by the use of the term "refugees" and provides for normative legitimacy for policy interventions (McAdam, 2012). A possible way to tackle the lack of an international consensus on the concept of "climate (or environmental) refugees" vs. "climate (or environmental) migrants", or "displaced persons due to change in their traditional environment", would be to attempt a definition of a series of concepts, instead of searching one universally accepted term. Additionally to the causes and types of migration phenomena that can be attributed to climate change, a third criterion should be based on an estimated degree of importance of the environmental driver of migration. Environmental change can be in some cases the foremost migration driver and thus be considered as a direct cause of displacement of persons, but in the majority of cases environmental change affects other migration drivers - economic, social, political and demographic - and plays the role of an indirect cause of displacement (Foresight, 2011). Depending on the impact of the environmental driver on other pillars (notably, on the most powerful economic driver) - or on its primordial role on triggering migration phenomena, a series of gradual concepts ought to be defined. In this logical approach, the concepts of "climate migrants" or "climate refugees" (after an eventual settlement of legal and normative disputes over the term of "refugee") would refer to displaced people forced or stimulated to migrate in a situation where the environmental driver undoubtedly played an uncontested first role. In other cases, intermediate (or gradual) concepts should be constructed and put in use.

2. Ethical aspects. A brief overview between alarmist and 'migration as adaptation' approaches

Different ways of defining terms related to migration (or displacement) induced by climate (environmental) change can often be explained by an application of various values grills. As stated above, the use of the term "refugees" to designate populations subject to displacement as a result of climate change clearly opens the way for a human rights defence discourse. In this optics, climate refugees are seen as the 'human face' of climate change (Gemenne, 2011), helping the subject to make its way into public awareness, and serving *in fine* the cause of climate change mitigation. Introducing the rights dimension into the climate refugees theme brings along the notions of responsibility, and engagement in favour of populations that

become vulnerable as a consequence of climate change. It should be noted here, that a holistic approach of vulnerability is necessarily taking into account persons who are undergoing migration experiences, as well as those who are left behind or "trapped" in unfavourable situations generated by environmental change (Foresight, 2011). These aspects are important in the underlying process of defining and attributing responsibilities regarding climate (in)justice.

The first mention of the concept of "environmental security" appeared in the Brundtland Report in 1987 (UN, 1987). It is strongly linked to the idea that human movements generated by environmental change will raise not only economic and social concerns, but will also evaluate into a top-priority security issue in the future. More than two decades later, in 2009, the UN Secretary General referred to climate change as to a 'threat multiplier' (UNSG, 2009), two years later he defined it as a "threat to international peace and security". Climate change and therefore migration, its most immediate and most visible effect, is viewed primarily as a security issue. In this set-up negative consequences of climate (environment) change may be tackled by deployment of security policies. This process, defined of "securitisation" of climate change (Trombetta, 2008) is simultaneous and competing with that of "climatisation", which refers to the framing of migration, security and conflict as issues relevant to the climate change agenda. According to Maertens and Baillat, the process of *climatisation of migration*, security and conflict may also be used as "a tool to dramatize and humanise climate change, while it also shines light on issues unrelated to climate change", as it has been observed during the COP21 event at the end of 2015 (Maertens and Baillat, 2017). As an illustration of the process of climatisation of migration within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) regime, we mention here the Cancun Adaptation Framework that encourages parties "To enhance action on adaptation [...] by undertaking, *inter alia* [...] Measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at the national, regional and international levels" (UNFCC, 2010). Understanding of how climate change affects human mobility, migration and displacement has been encouraged by the Doha Decision of 2012 (UNFCCC, 2013), whilst the Paris Agreement concluded as a result of COP21 establishes a Task Force on displacement under the auspice of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (UNFCCC, 2016).

In the light of the 'securitisation' *vs.* 'climatisation' strategies applied in the public discourse migration appears both as a consequence of environment-related conflicts, and as a trigger of future conflicts. Although migration itself is a multi-causal phenomenon with environmental issues being just one among other competing drivers (Foresight, 2011), the scarcity of empirical evidence conducts to a conclusion that a clear link between climate (environment) induced migration and violent conflicts may not be established yet. Nevertheless, numerous alarmist scenarios featuring tens and hundreds of millions of climate refugees originating

from the South and threatening national and international security, especially in the North, have been developed over the past several decades. References to recent conflicts that are sometimes attributed to "climate change conflict" category will be given in another section of this chapter.

Proliferation of alarmist scenarios and their misuse by some political forces in the North countries may lead to counterproductive and xenophobic measures adopted by the governments of these countries, intended to 'protect' against waves of "violent" climate refugees. In this case, responsibility to counteract potential negative effects of migration generated by climate change lies upon the States that need to take on the responsibility to secure their population and prevent human rights violations (Bettini *et al.*, 2016). In the liberal interventionist paradigm, this core principle extends beyond national borders and applies to other States that are unable or unwilling to do the same. Largely implemented in the 1990's, this interventionist paradigm is being continuously modified since the beginning of the years 2000, by the introduction of the concept of 'resilience'. It is generally accepted, that a resilient individual or community is able to withstand, adapt to and recover from external disturbances. Applied to climate change – which is viewed as an unavoidable external disturbance – resilience means that affected communities must adapt. A double shift is therefore operated: first, responsibility for climate change mitigation lies no longer upon central States but with individuals or relatively small groups of individuals (family, village, local community); second, the 'climate refugee' narrative enters into a harsh competition with another narrative, that views migration induced by climate change as an adaptation strategy. Although it held a dominant position until recently, the 'climate refugees' discourse linking climate change to mass displacement and (in)security is considered to be a rather maximalist and alarmist approach (Morrissey, 2012; Gemenne, 2011). It calls for a response in terms of security management, focusing on implementation of specific mechanisms of humanitarian emergency. On the other hand, the 'migration as adaptation' paradigm calls for another type of response, constructed on elements of development management. From this latter standpoint, financial and social remittances are considered as a positive outcome of the migration phenomena, contributing to reinforcing individual (and community) capacity to adapt to climate change. In the following section we will see that the shift in the climate change – migration nexus, i.e. the transition from the 'climate refugees' to the 'migration as adaptation strategy' is not yet fully accomplished, as the figure of the climate refugee has seemingly experienced a renaissance in the context of the Syrian conflict and of the Mediterranean migrants (Gemenne, 2015).

3. Migration challenge, diplomacy and human security in a multidimensional and globalized world

Climate challenges are transnational and the policy solutions for them can be funded only at the supranational or international level. Climate diplomacy plays a strategic role because climate security issues are often not relevant with the national (state) or the local level. The European Union, the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) are among the most important intergovernmental organizations (IGO's) that have a large interest in the process of dealing with global climate security problems (Dellmuth, 2018). However, climate security risks are directly linked to governance efforts across policy areas, such as security, diplomacy, peace and conflict, development, migration, etc.

As an IGO, the European Union plays a very important role in the global climate security governance. The EU institutions share conceptualizations and theoretical outlooks and provide deep knowledge about these topics, but at the same time the effectiveness across these policy areas of climate security and the challenges related to it is not so preeminent. Institutional changes, concerted actions of member states and EU-level climatic and migration policies do not suffice in their actual form because they are not strong enough to protect European citizens from natural cataclysms and disasters, sudden or chronic climate risks. Furthermore, the effects of climate changes are indirectly influencing the field of security and vulnerability in a larger context: water and energy infrastructure, interdependencies in the supply chain of key commodities, social and political institutions, economical development, etc.

Climate change has a multidimensional impact. Understanding climate migration as a new challenge for the European diplomacy and simultaneously its impact on human security is one of the objectives of this research. We will put an emphasis on the difficulties faced by the European common migration policy and will discuss the "migration crisis" of 2015 in an attempt to illustrate the functioning of European institutions in a situation of emergency and crisis management. Also, climate security, "as a condition where people, communities, and states have the capacities to manage stresses emerging from climate change and variability" (Adger, 2010) plays an important role in the acknowledgement and the discourses of policymakers. Secularizing climate change and the notion of human security will induce the untrue idea that the migration crisis is only about a half of the problem rather than relating to a holistic approach of the issue. In specialized research "failed secularization" appears to be an instrumental act that has been permitted by the IGO's in order to legitimize actions or policies that disadvantage vulnerable groups (Adger, 2010).

Since 2008, within the EU the climate security challenge was considered insignificant, the academic community seeing that the secularization of "climate refugees", diplomacy and conflict prevention shaped the wrong discourses

(Trombetta, 2014). "In the context of migration, the EU has linked the notion of 'environmental migrants' to a growing extent to climate change, which has influenced EU policies in Southern Mediterranean countries" (Geddes, 2015) and adopted a broad definition of security. Combining state and human security is necessary for the IGO's working in partnership because the solutions of the migrants' crisis are about human beings. Multiple governance is integrated by the IGO's in their climate security challenge because international actors such as NATO, EU, the United Nations (UN), or the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) are engaged with a mandate of environment, development and humanitarian affairs. In this context the question of reinforcing state security was legitimated and brought the idea that States need to maintain the focus on the military forces in order to remain strong in front of climate change effects. It's the case for NATO, but also for the EU, as the Union wants to build a European army and to reinforce its external frontiers with a more efficient Europol and Frontex. The European External Action Service (EEAS) aims to develop an efficient assessment methodology creating a European Coast Guard Agency that will enhance security of EU citizens. A new Action Plan was signed recently by the executive Directors of Frontex and Europol, its main objective being to reinforce cooperation and favour a better structural exchange of information and more efficient border guards activities in order to protect the external frontiers but also to have targeted actions against criminal groups and terrorists[1]. A new standing corps of 10 000 staff will be prepared in 2027, double if compared with the actual staff (EP, 2019).

4. Climate challenges from the perspective of global security governance and the security risks

The EU is combining state and human security prospective in the field of migration policy. The risks caused by environmental change are inter-related with regional crisis that affect people and their security. Statistical data show that the climate issue is the first preoccupation of citizens and at the same time it is perceived as the first threat, together with the overcrowding of population and the deterioration of the environmental setting (Ortiz-Paniagua, 2017).

The growing degree of preoccupation regarding issues related to environmental change and migration policy does not lead to a state of convergence upon definitions of terms, origins of migration waves or ways to tackle negative effects. Instead, one may witness the emergence of a number of theories highlighting the importance of climate topics and their effects on migration policy, as well as the need for application of security measures. At the European level, policymakers have increasingly engaged in the analysis of the EU common migration policy, given the complexity of the 2015 migrant crisis. In order to protect citizens, military force and reinforcement of external frontiers are crucial

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[1] Read more about Frontex (2019) at https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/europol-and-frontex-sign-new-joint-action-plan-NS6YYK.

for the prevention of climate security risks. Moreover, the challenges related to climate issues are trans-boundary, the climate security risks also and awareness of this fact pushes coordination of policy areas in the field of the environment to be linked with such topics as maintaining peace, climate security and human rights (McBean, 2011). More integrated governance is necessary at the European level. Besides, the incising problems call for more cooperation and a strengthened synergy in order to ensure global solutions for the global climate security challenge. Concrete agreements, policies and formal arrangements need to be formalized in order to shape the actors' behaviour but also to emphasize the institutional changes in the context of the rise of transnational problems such as climate challenge or migration. States are affected, non-state actors such as NGO's or civil society (Keohane, 2005) are too, along with vulnerable people. New governance approaches and policies on climate security matters need to be adjusted in order to find solutions and to evaluate the conditions under which this global challenge can be countered at the domestic or national level.

5. The complex link between conflicts and environmental security attributed to climate change

Civil war in the Darfur region of Sudan was the first case of a conflict attributed to climate change. In an article published in The Washington Post in June 2007 the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon explained that the conflict in this region is a direct consequence of climate warming that induced reduction of rainfall leading to a sharp decrease in available resources and in fine a harsh territorial competition between local groups of sedentary and nomad populations (Ban Ki-Moon, 2007). This viewpoint was sustained by other articles published by different scholars, explaining the violence in Darfur by the mere superposition of persistent poverty, environment degradation and climate warming (Felli, 2016). The idea of climate change generating large masses of climate (environmental) migrants producing disorder is not new. At the end of the 1980's the development of the concept of "environmental security" conducted to the identification of environmental migrants as potential sources of threat for the national security of Western countries. An emblematic example used to illustrate this fear of environmental refugees surging in large numbers along American coasts and 'invading' the national territory is that of the Haitian "boat people" (Matthews, 1989). Other similar studies depict apocalyptic scenarios, of hordes of poor and hungry persons from the South entering richer countries in the North and spreading chaos and despair (Pearce, 1989; Tickell, 2001). The fact that these standpoints have been sometimes expressed by influential policy makers (Jessica Matthews, American strategist or Crispin Tickell, advice to Prime-Minister Margaret Thatcher) means that the process of 'securitisation' of migration phenomena induced by climate change succeeded in fixing the subject on the political agenda,

but in a way that is opposite to migrants' interests and rights, by depicting them as a threat for national security (Felli, 2016).

Another more recent case of violent conflict attributed to climate change is the Syrian civil war that started in March 2011. In this case severe droughts during several years prior to the beginning conflict have forced internal displacement of large masses from rural areas to ill-equipped urban areas, left without appropriate support by the Assad regime (Malm, 2014). The 'refugees crisis' of 2015 in the European Union is partially, though indirectly, attributed to climate change. The Syrian crisis in its multidimensional aspects has channelled numerous research publications over the past years. All of them do not share the deterministic viewpoint, linking climate change manifested by severe droughts that have occurred at the end of the years 2000's to the internal turmoil that burst into a violent civil war, generating as a consequence millions of internal and international refugees. Indeed, things are more complicated than that. A mono-cause interpretation leaves space to a historical retrospective, where climate change is just one of the many factors leading to conflict. Lack of a fair resource distribution system, highly-corrupt state apparatus, disrespect of human rights, unsound patterns of economic development over the past several decades – these and other factors seem to have played a primordial role in the eruption of protests and the outburst of internal violence in Syria since March 2011.

Similarly, in-depth analysis taking into account internal developments in Sudan over several decades (since the end of the 1960's) disqualifies the conflict in Darfur as a 'climate change conflict'. Whilst climate change leading to a more pronounced scarcity of resources in the region has triggered violence, concrete causes of the turmoil are rooted in long-lasting political and economic processes that have been implemented in order to favour highly-productive, export-oriented mechanised agriculture in the Valley of the Nile (Verhoeven, 2011). Detrimental to peripheral regions like Darfur, application of these policies aggravated regional rivalries, accentuated economical marginalisation and accumulation of frustration over diminishing resources on a local level.

Both examples depicted above illustrate the difficulties occurring in the attempt to apply theoretical models elaborated by researchers to concrete situations. It is rather difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate the number of 'climate refugees' in the aftermath of the Darfur and the Syrian conflicts (the latter not yet being terminated at the moment of writing of this article). Moreover, attributing a conflict to the "climate change conflict" category is not a simple endeavour, especially after an evaluation of the historical context, of local political and economic processes and of disturbances of long-lasting power equilibriums on a national and regional level. From an ethical viewpoint, attributing conflicts solely to climate change factors would diminish the share of responsibility of autocratic and undemocratic regimes. This aspect adds to the complexity of the matter, making it even more difficult to label large masses of displaced persons into categories related to the concepts of "climate refugees" or "climate migrants".

6. What global governance for climate (environmental) migrants/refugees?

One of the main aspects of critique related to the concept of climate/environmental refugees is the inadequacy of this notion to the existing definition and framework of the term 'refugee'. The current regime of protection of refugees is provided for by the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Under these frameworks protection is restricted to individual political refugees fleeing their countries because of state-led persecution, thus not covering 'climate refugees' (McGregor, 1994). Two regional conventions – the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees – offer a broader definition of the term 'refugee', extending it to people fleeing from serious disturbance of public order, and referring to groups. Nonetheless, these two regional conventions do not make any specific mention regarding 'climate refugees'.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is at present the cornerstone of the international system of refugee protection. This institution functions under the 1951 Geneva Convention and its Protocol of 1967. In 2007 the UNHCR covered 11.4 million refugees worldwide; together with the asylum seekers, returnees, stateless persons and a portion of internally displaced persons, the institution dealt in 2007 with a number of 31.7 million persons (UNHCR, 2008). In little over a decade, these figures more than doubled: as of June 2018, the number of refugees surged to an unprecedented 25.4 million persons, whilst together with the asylum seekers, stateless persons and internally displaced persons under the institution's mandate the figure amounts to almost 80 million persons (UNHCR, 2018).

At present 'climate refugees' are not covered by the UNHCR mandate. Although based on few research works, attempts to empirically estimate the number of climate refugees in the future seem to generate figures that largely exceed the current number of refugees under the protection of UNHCR. Depending on the source, estimated figures range between 200 million (Myers and Kent, 1995), revised to 212 million (Myers, 2002) and 300 million (Christian Aid, 2007) 'climate refugees' by the year 2050. This amounts to between 8 and 12 times more than the present number of refugees under the UNHCR mandate (!).

In the created situation Biermann and Boas proposed a Protocol on Recognition, Protection and Resettlement of Climate Refugees (the "Climate Refugees Protocol") to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Biermann and Boas, 2010). Based upon 5 governing principles (planned re-location and resettlement, resettlement instead of temporary asylum, collective rights for local populations, international assistance for domestic measures and international burden-sharing), the 'Climate Refugees Protocol would be the foundation of a future global governance system of environment/climate induced migration. Arguments in favour of such a sui generis regime for governing climate

change – migration nexus include the possibility to forecast and plan massive population movements, raising the level of preparedness to handle future crisis. Three types of financial mechanisms – general development funding agencies, environment-related funds and a new funding agency especially conceived for climate refugees – negotiated both by receiving and donor countries, would provide for protection and compensation to climate refugees. As an addition to this proposal of funding mechanism, we suggest identification of a specific method to raise additional funds from private companies in industrialized countries. Responsibility for climate change over the past two centuries does not lie exclusively with the governments of industrialized countries – the notion of climate justice should find its application also to private companies with a significant contribution to industrial processes that have led to anthropogenic climate change.

7. Common migration policy in the EU as a response to the global challenge of the climate transformations

During the last seven decades Europe was a continent of peace and was transformed into a land of immigration. Public policies were deployed in order to facilitate exchanges and to create a Union of countries favouring the free movement of persons. The first efforts to regulate movement of persons have their origins in the Treaty of Rome from 1957. Afterwards regulations were improved by the inclusion of families of those who migrate in order to pursue their economic activities. In the 1970's, 1980's and the 1990's the immigration and asylum question was in the centre of the policy debate. Common policy was shaped in order to organize labour migrants, refugees and asylums seekers but also to redefine collective borders. We are witnessing today the emergence of a unique regional migration regime in Europe (Lavenex, 2003). Regarding refugees and asylum seekers, they are protected nominally by the global refugees' regime, as described in the previous section. The emergent migration and asylum regime of the European Union are formal arrangements but the rules are negotiated with varying degrees of obligations.

As a response to climate change and the migration crisis from 2015, the EU explores its effective power in order to strengthen its common migration policy, by reinforcing external borders and stressing on the need to articulate uniformly applicable policies at the gates of Europe. The 2015 crisis showed that unilateral policy-making needs to be reinforced by multilateral arrangements. In recent years millions of people have fled for Europe from conflict, terror and persecution in their own countries (Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.). In 2015 there were 1.83 million illegal crossings at the EU's external borders (EP, 2015). European Commission's initial plan was completely ineffective, as multilateralism appears as a desirable option but in practice the existing policies were estimated to be inadequate for the magnitude of the problem. Member states decided that they will be involved in receiving the migrants according to the established quotas, but applying these

principles into reality turned out to be difficult. The Commission had to take the lead of developing a harmonized plethora of national regulations in order to create an efficient common migration system. Reinforcement of the asylum system and sharing responsibility between EU countries is at the heart of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), taking its legal roots in the Dublin regulation.

The Common European Asylum System aims to offer appropriate status to any third country national requiring international protection in one of the Member States. The Stockholm Programme, adopted on 10 December 2009 for the 2010-2014 period, reaffirms "the objective of establishing a common area of protection and solidarity based on a common asylum procedure" (Stockholm Programme, 2009). July 2013 was a very important moment for the asylum because the Eurodac Regulation (Eurodac Regulation, 2013) was created with the Dublin III Regulation (Dublin Regulation, 2013), the Reception Conditions Directive (Directive 2013/33, 2013) and the Asylum Procedures Directive (Directive 2013/32, 2013). These texts are the most important concerning the migrant and asylum procedure. In 2015 the European Commission created a new European Border and Coast Guard with the aim of reinforcing the management and security of the EU's external borders and supporting national border guards.

The Commission adopted in May 2015 a European Agenda of Migration setting up a better cooperation between the EASO, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (formerly Frontex) and Europol. An emergency relocation mechanism for a total of 160 000 people in need of international protection was adopted as a principle of solidarity. The EURODAC is an asylum fingerprint database.

On a global level, in September 2016 the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (UNHCR, 2016)[2]. The purpose of the international community is to respond to large movements of refugees and migrants.

The European Union created budgetary instruments in the area of asylum: the Asylum Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), with an allocation for 2014-2020 recently increased from EUR 3.31 billion to EUR 6.6 billion. EU wants to strengthen and develop all aspects of the CEAS, its internal and international dimensions, including the budget. In order to be ready to provide full operational support on asylum procedures in the future, the Commission proposes a budget of EUR 1.25 billion for the 2021 - 2027 period. Other funds, such as the European Social Fund, the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived and the European Regional Development Fund also allocate financial resources, mostly to support the integration of refugees and migrants.

The European Parliament also has a role in the field of asylum. It ensures the principle of fairer sharing of the burden borne by the member state at EU's external borders. Complex combinations of factors determine institutional change for the

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[2] UNHCR, (2016), (retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/57e39d987).

migration policy of the EU, the notion of security as a common military capacity and institutional synergies. The main advantage for the future of the EU is the effectiveness of a complementary mixed-methods and institutions in order to find the best solutions for this policy area and the security of citizens living on the European territory. The degree of institutionalization of these new governance arrangements need to prove their effectiveness over time and in the context of specific events as natural disasters, natural catastrophes, climate changes (Young, 2011). Given the trans-boundary nature of climate migration, an efficient system can be created with the national and local but also European level governance. Governments, NGO's and IGO's need to work together for a better level of human security. Without cooperation and an effective Common European Asylum System that will legalize all the asylum seekers, the action will be suboptimal and invite climate migration policies to failure (Vignon, 2018). Synergies become essential for realizing the preservation of local, national and European security in today's more global world. Migration needs to be an adaptable strategy able to increase the resilience of vulnerable communities to the environmental crisis (Rothe, 2017).

Conclusions

The lack of an international consensus on the definition of the term designating persons suffering and forced to be displaced as a consequence of climate change (or, rather, as a consequence of security issues related to climate change) is not a purely academic or research artefact. Beyond scientific debate, it is a matter of principle which is closely linked to the approach adopted by States, Inter-Governmental Organizations or civil society regarding the understanding of the climate - migration nexus. The need for a new, multi-level (multi-category) definition for persons undergoing climate (or environmental) migration is obvious - its identification would be the starting point of common international efforts in the field.

Global governance of climate change, migration and security issues is very complex, sometimes overlapping in terms of institutions, mandates and international financial aid, but also leaving many uncovered spots. In this sense, identifying common definitions and concepts related to this domain would greatly facilitate the design of new international institutions, the channelling of financial resources and the implementation of large-scale international programs needed in order to address the needs of the most vulnerable populations. Recognition and repartition of responsibilities is more than a purely 'philosophical' or 'ethical' issue - indeed, after decades of principles enunciation and declarations of good will the time for concrete action has come. Finding ways for a larger participation in the funding of a global governance system of climate change and migration (extending the financial responsibilities on private business) is a key challenge.

Whilst reaching a consensus within the EU member states is not a simple endeavour, significant progress has been made during the last several decades.

Climate challenges are transnational and policy solutions for them can have a solid foundation at supranational or international level. The 2015 crisis demonstrated to European stakeholders that unilateral policy-making needs to be reinforced by multilateral arrangements. Furthermore, international conflicts and environmental security affects all of us, on all continents and in all countries. By leaving behind its status of passive observer of migration processes occurring in regions of its close neighbourhood, the European Union aims at becoming an active player, forging not only a common migration and asylum policy, but also making use of diplomatic tools in order to prevent massive emigration from countries of origin. By doing so the EU enforces its role as a major player on the international diplomatic arena, placing itself in a central position of the future climate change and migration global governance system.

The humanitarian emergency in climate change has a multidimensional impact. 'Climate refugees' are not covered by the UNHCR mandate or by international law. Being part of a complex system of cause-effect relationships but also part of a multi-causal phenomenon related to environmental issues, migration refugees need international and regional protection. Resilience is not the only option for this issue. The foundation of a future global governance system is inevitable. International organisations, EU, states, business and civil society need to work together in a cross-border approach in the field of environment/climate migration topic in order to find practical long-term solutions. Financial mechanisms need to be created also. An international plan is needed for governing the climate change - migration nexus and massive population movements that are still to come. The level of preparedness and awareness is crucial in order to determine precisely how to handle the future crisis. Efficient management of climate change, including in its 'migrations' dimension is the responsibility of each government, IGO's, private companies and a general concern of each human being.

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