

EU CITIZENSHIP AND IDENTITY

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Abstract

Is there a possibility to harmonize the EU policy concerning migration since many people feel threatened in their most prized personal security, their national and European identity? Most probably not for the moment. Is it possible to mitigate the general anxiety so that European peoples can build confidence over time concerning newcomers? Some believe it is possible. One way would be a strong political will to enforce jus soli over jus sanguini, in several stages. As a first stage, we may consider a precursory statute to citizenship, a temporary and conditional one, to whom we should gradually attach rights depending on individual merits achieved in time and which may eventually lead to obtaining the full citizenship statute. Through the agency of this statute, we can build a legitimate framework for gradual integration, based on clear norms and criteria, allowing the migrant to gain access to fundamental rights. Whether such frame protects the migrant from institutional violence or not depends on how he or she is finally perceived by the local community. Before that, we should discuss the migrant's statute as well as the right to settle in EU, achieve rights and obligations in direct ratio with his new statute. The aim of this article is to identify how social identity is formed for the new migrants by reference to their ethnical roots and identity markers of the host nation from EU, while its purpose is to propose a way to convert this newly acquired identity into a limited and conditional citizenship.

Keywords: citizenship, identity, integration, migrant statute, migration policy

Introduction

When we consider European citizenship and identity, three standpoints come to mind. First is the European history, mirrored in particular social behaviour. We see an affiliation to European citizenship and identity substantiated by shared cultural, racial, religious, and societal values. The extent to which these values is still valid, remains to be seen since each of them are challenged nowadays by political groups throughout the EU. The other two standpoints are individual needs and social groups and communities' goals respectively, namely survival, prosperity, and security.

Kant, Hegel, and Huntington consider that identity is created only simultaneous with a negative „otherness” creation. Such a negative „other” helps build nations and states as long as it remains outside the territorial map of the

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group. But when it insinuates itself inside the group by claiming his adherence to the in-group, his very existence is perceived as a threat to the fundamental identity values on which the group's identity was shaped (Hardin, 1997). Each European nation is formed using a specific set of identity markers, such as language, bloodline, and culture, in different combinations where some are more valued than others (Mercer, 2014). Therefore, a nation formed mainly by blood lineage is more reluctant to accept newcomers compared to nations where the primary identity marker is their language or culture.

Separating people in civilizations by racial and cultural characteristics is subject to heated debates for many centuries. We make a distinction today between civilization and race. There are peoples from the same race divided by civilization and peoples racially mixt but united by civilization. Christianity and Islam are examples of racially multifarious societies but divided into groups level by values, beliefs, institutions, and social structures. States forming a civilization are much more connected one to another than with states situated outside the civilization, mostly with economic ties.

By civilization, we understand the largest cultural entity consisting of groups with cultural traits and identity that makes them different from other groups. Objective elements that define them as a group are language, history, religion, habits, institutions, and subjective self-referencing that makes them feel apart from external otherness. More important, a civilization is also bound by a stable territory, which is the firm base of the said civilization (Wendt, 1994).

Nationalism is an organic ideology designed to dominate or exclude, corresponding to the national institution and based upon stating visible and invisible borders materialized in laws and practices. The very essence of a nation mould is the exclusion or the preferential access to certain resources and rights depending on individual categorization as national or allogeneic (Waeber, 1995).

It is a natural task to condemn national confinement without considering the relationship between inclusion and exclusion characterizing each political organization. Inclusion or integration of certain individuals automatically entails exclusion of others since the collective identity of the national in-group is defined against any other out-groups. Any characterization is separating and classifying individuals and hence is discriminatory, but identity statements are construed on the opposition of the "self" to the "other". Still, a nation is more extensive than an ethnic group and therefore should be more open to the otherness in specific ways.

1. Identity construction

A social identity is built on cognitive factors and motivational influences. The need for positive differentiation is the most critical factor, and group identity is usually formed by positively comparing the in-group members to the out-groups. An individual has multiple identities derived from various groups memberships, but only ethnic and national memberships have significant political consequences.

Identity content consists of four major elements shared by the identity proposal, designed to separate them from other groups (Herrmann *et al.*, 2009): constitutive norms, relational rules with other groups, social goal, and the general sense of group existence. But the essential value is the social identity, as the most vulnerable to threats, and the primary cause of upheavals for groups resisting integration in the EU. Members of groups with inferior social status tend to develop a separate identity based on positively assessed attributes or fight to change the negative image of the group. They need to increase the importance of the positive traits of their group while balancing the need for belonging to the unicity one. As a result, the most insecure members identify themselves typical members of the in-group and thus form stereotypes and prejudices.

It is true that identity construction has been based historically on the creation of the “other”. Does this necessarily mean that the national identity needs an “other” or if it exists, must be excluded violently? In the Hegel-Huntington line of thought, borders between “us” and “them” are relatively inflexible once established since both identity and solidarity would be threatened by the inclusion of others (Buzan, 1991). Still, the concept of the “other” is very fluid, and there is sufficient evidence of categories once excluded that became rightful members of the nation. African-Americans in the US are such an example.

The cornerstone of society, defined as a cluster of institutions combined with the feeling of a shared identity, is its identity. By societal security, we mean the society’s resilience to change and keeping its essential character when facing identity issues or migrations. Political actors claiming that societal security is endangered use as a main argument the existential threat.

From the constructivism standpoint, identity construction is rooted in individuals’ need to build a rich narrative about themselves, within a process that explains why the collective identity is larger than the sum of involved individuals (Ross, 2006). During this process, collective answers such as nationalism and religion are more prized once notions such as self, other and identity suffer changes. Along insecure periods of time the previously inoffensive “other” is reconstructed as a dangerous enemy with an emotional dimension of security discourse.

The identity is a society feature, not a human trait. Born from interactions between people and institutions, it has a descriptive function for the society which has a defining identity. Some have no choice other than acknowledging that identity, to which they belong whereas the state, by using its political instruments becomes the umpire of the collective identity’s components and social order. Identity may also be understood as a base of social or political action indicating a resemblance among group members, or just the product of multiple or competing political discourses.

2. Individual and collective identities

Individual and collective identities are defined by answering the general questions “who I am?” and “who we are?”. Though relevant, these answers cannot be founded exclusively on subjective perceptions nor history, folklore, or founding



myths. A collective identity also means perception issues regarding vulnerabilities and threats. So, people join groups to interact and share culture and group interests (Greenhill, 2008).

Conflicts between groups that are in constant contact are resolved only when these engage in cooperation activities to dissolve belonging group distinction and form a collective identity by removing formerly existing barriers between them. That is possible since a group assuming a more substantial identity does not necessarily lose its original identity but forms a so-called dual identity.

A collective identity appears when individuals and then groups recognize each other and conjoin. The necessary binds result from interactions and participation in joint activities that form collective identities. Alexander Wendt posits that large collective identities are shaped by conflictual processes level after level until a universal collective identity shall be formed, entitled “World State” (Wendt A., 2003).

Group identities are not uniform and vary in intensity. Everything depends on the group prominence; when this is strong, the group identity counts, when is weak, the individual identity is more important. From all identities, the ethnic, religious, and political ones have the highest potential to become collective identities.

Separatist conflicts appear all over the world fuelled by attempts establish or preserve distinct group identities and prevent undesired cultural or political fusion into a more comprising collective identity. For nationalist movements, apart from particular identities’ recognition (Honneth and Farrel, 1997), the next important issue is the authorized use of legitimate violence. Such power usually belongs to the state, which occupies a defined territory and is held responsible for governing a defined population with a specific social statute.

Emotions at the group level are stronger than at the individual level as the emotional relief brings confidence and validates personal feelings. Stronger positive or negative reactions depend on the intensity of individual identification with their group. The weaker this identification is, the less receptive is that person to negative information, so it feels less guilt (Dovidio *et al.*, 2010).

3. Social identity. Self-categorization.

One of the conclusions of the Social Identity Theory (Tajfel *et al.*, 1979) was that distinction between “us” and “them” lead to change in the way people perceive each other, process called categorization. When categorial distinctions are strong, one interesting thing happens once a person has changed his views concerning attitudes, memories, behaviours, and emotions that define and distinguish him from other persons: perception grows regarding similar traits in the in-groups and differences compared to the out-group. The outlook about the self, derived from the social categories to which he belongs, together with corresponding emotional consequences form the so-called “social identity”.



Individuals assess their groups by comparing them with other groups and shape their actions and way of thinking so that to obtain or maintain a positive distinction for their group, thus acquiring a positive social identity for themselves, too. A particular situation is when individuals belong to a group with relatively inferior statute compared to other groups, such as the immigrants are perceived. The group members shall adapt their strategies to circumstances, depending on how pervious the group borders and how stable or legitimate differences of statute really are. Possible actions range from physically or psychologically leaving the group to adopting more favourable comparisons for his group and militating for existing state overturning by social change.

According to Social Identity Theory, self-categorization operates at three levels of inclusion: as a human being, social identity, and personal identity. Individuals chose to self-categorize themselves according to two criteria. First, the chosen category must be accessible to them. Then, it must be suitable both comparatively and normatively, meaning that perceived belonging is aligned with stereotypical expectations. (Huddy, 2001). Once a category is chosen for self-referencing, the individual is depersonalized since his social category attributes fluctuate and group members are interchangeable in a subjective way.

The Social Identity Theory is relevant for the current article because it helps us understand the identity mechanisms at personal and group levels on the one hand and social influence on the other. Leaders embrace the rhetoric that helps them embody the prototypical attitudes, behaviours, and values of their group to be perceived as legitimate and influential and thus gain control over resources. The social identity approach makes more comfortable the grasp of political norms, communication, and psychology on the one hand as well as the prediction of attitudes and behaviours on the other.

The same approach deals with motivational factors. Establishing group borders entails forms social identity but leads to ethnocentrism and discrimination within the group. Depending on minority group prominence, its members are likely to self-reference themselves in identity terms by using categorial stereotypes with clearly defined sets of rules and common characteristics. As a result, members of the in-group are categorized into typical or prominent. For this to happen, the group needs a referential prototype, namely a real or fictional person that embodies the most common or frequent traits shared by the group members. Individual self-categorization happens due to perceived similarity with the prototype and plays the central role in shaping and developing the social identity (Halperin, 2004).

4. Ethnic identity

Individuals from ethnic minorities must simultaneously negotiate their identification with the minority group and with the central culture of the society, due to distinctive racial and cultural traits. Their ethnical identity is a significant motivation for them engage and participate with other members from the same group in cultural and organizational practices or social networks, given the opportunities. Attitude is a standard feature among the group's participants, but



behaviour depends on each's personality or interests. Within the minority group, ethnic identity is founded on pride, and strong attachment to the in-group values and therefore identification with the majority group is only possible by acculturation.

There are four typologies considered for a minority individual's orientation: integration, separation, assimilation, and marginalization. Under certain circumstances, minority individuals may assume bicultural identity labels, be it mixed or alternant if they perceive the two cultures as non-conflictual and integrated. For such individuals, the relationship between ethnic and national identity may vary from negative to positive depending on how they perceive themselves as integrated or rejected by the society (Hornsey, 2008).

Both the minority ethnic and the majority groups are parts of the same national society. If the ethnic identity correlates in a positive way to the national identity giving birth to a bicultural integrated identity, each group identity shall manifest a range of individual variabilities with unique effects. The only psychological key variable in this process is the self-esteem.

What happens within the majority group? When individuals have their dignity certified by the recognition of a comparable statute, they incline towards cooperation, but when they feel superior, confident and fearless against competition, they incline towards conflict. Resulting conflict generates a cycle where chauvinists perceive others as disobedient and defying, while the minority perceives the majority group as arrogant and greedy (Huddy, 2001).

In the immigrants' case, they might not become ethnocentric and even develop a particular fondness to the host-nation depending on the functional relationship between his nation of origin and the nation of allegiance. A negative relationship might inject additional emotional fuel altering the intensity of phenomena and perceptions. Further identification with a national identity would generate a sense of duty towards the host nation and concern for distributive justice.

Social identity sources are typically examined within historical and cultural contexts and considering their impact on social psychology. There are four critical issues to be assessed: existence of identity choice, subjective meaning of identities, intensity range of identities, and social and political identity steadiness. This approach is needed to catch all the aspects of fluid, multi-faceted, and situationally contingent identities (Turner *et al.*, 1998).

New ethnic and religious groups formed by immigrants and politically throughout EU are sometimes suspected of seeking mainly material gains and tangible benefits. Though right to a certain extent, such goal cannot explain alone their movements by ignoring their pursuit of respect and recognition. The inferior statute of the minority group and intra-group categorization factors create preliminary conditions that generate collective action. Research shows that belonging to a prominent minority group entails antipathy towards other groups, but this requires a compelling internalized subjective identity, whereas not all members strongly identify themselves with their ethnic group.

5. European civilization and identity

The European international system has included along the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries other civilizations' societies, failed to build an international society due to missing a common culture. The western European civilization, however, has as a core a sum of institutions, practices, and beliefs that are not necessarily original but shaped into a unique combination. (Huntington, 1996)

First, there is the classical inheritance: Greek philosophy and rationalism, Roman law and Christianity. Then comes the European languages; language comes second after religion as a differentiation factor for people in distinct cultures. Western Europe has a greater variety of languages than any other civilization. Third comes the separation between spiritual and temporal authorities; this division contributed decisively in developing freedom as we know it. Rule of Law is the next central concept, inherited from Romans, the cornerstone for constitutionalism and principal protection against arbitrary power; human rights and proprietary rights are subjacent to this principle. The last two features, social pluralism and individualism are the most recent the most distinctive, too.

In the second part of the twentieth century, Western Europe became a universal state by aggregating federations, confederations, international organizations, and regimes. EU has been built starting from a Germany-France core and now includes 28 states, but a unitary civilization is yet just a goal.

Nations cannot come into existence without developing a nationalist ideology. The structural combination between state institutions and social forces require an organic ideology, which is the nationalism (Huntington, 1997). Nationalist ideologies are not identical because every nation produces their very own symbols, fictions, and myths, but they have the same goal, namely building a national identity that eventually would prevail against and integrate all other identities. Nationalist ideology is corresponding to the national institution, and therefore is based on exclusion rules and borders materialized in laws and practices.

Sometimes the border between nationals and allogeneics is just a matter of politics, characteristic to Western Europe due to its postcolonial status. In such case, nation-states and their populations have great difficulties to self-define as the exclusion rule becomes historically invalid, hence impossible to maintain (Ditlmann *et al.*, 2011). The result is potential structural violence, be it institutional or spontaneous, visible or not. Political elections form collective identities, but democracies define and enforce specific programs to fight exclusions and discriminations. Though self-sufficient nationality is fading away, nation states cannot exist without nationalism. Therefore, some national traditions are open, tolerant, and universalist, while others are the opposite. There is finally no good or bad nationalism. It is the degree of civilization that converts violence into power or domination symbols that may degenerate.

Making a distinction between primary and secondary identities is essential. The national identity, formed by narratives and legends, beliefs and institutional



practices is a secondary identity. Conversely, ethnicity is a primary identity forming a robust identification model by combining cultural and racial characteristics. Individual personality weighs in, too, but it is not formed independently from social processes and collective imaginary.

Some fundamental institutions of the nation mold, such as national labour rules, family structures, religious organizations, and the army are generating dual belongings to primary identities by attaching social and moral attributes to each of them. The (national) education system shows best why primary identifications such as regional, linguistic, and religious are very difficult to shape into secondary identifications of the national and civic levels, which makes difficult for self-referencing as Europeans (Herrmann *et al.*, 2009).

Primary identities stand against integration, though individuals accept it on an intellectual level. Minorities and foremost immigrants can be incorporated in the national identity only after a prolonged exposure to the education systems' procedures.

6. Acquired vs. attributed identities

There is an essential distinction between identities achieved by personal choice and those assigned. Identity features assigned in the past from birth, such as religion, education, and economic status are nowadays a matter of choice, so the only prominent features remained the need for authenticity and external recognition (Mansbach *et al.*, 2007).

Some groups are more pervious than others and grant the individuals the freedom to acquire or relinquish their group identity even when confronted with relatively stable borders. The obstacle is the external labelling of the group. If belonging to a group is too evident for third parties for reasons such as skin colour, language, cultural practices, and physical characteristics, it makes very hard for the group member to avoid the said labelling. On the plus side, political groups have less firm borders than ethnic ones.

For acquired identities, it is vital to make a distinction between belonging to a social category and internalizing respective significance. In other words, there is a distinction between a nominal identity based on a name and unifying common characteristics on the one hand, and virtual belonging to a group where the members are aware of the similarities by which they define themselves, on the other.

As the group members try to raise the group status by redefining the negative identities, there is a discrepancy between the significance assumed by the in-group and the one attributed by the out-groups. Hence the original members will internalize the historical and cultural significances through the agency of four factors: membership statute, defining characteristics of the prototypical member, values revered, and typical characteristics of the external groups that help define the in-group.

The membership statute associates patriotic symbols in the nationalist group case, towards each member may feel the attachment with different intensity, but still being recognized as group members. As a comparison, political group identity is encompassing more nuances and intensities, depending in which extent the member identifies himself with the prototypical member.

Identity significance has borders shaped by dialogue with the external group members, so group identity is more intense for the in-group when confronted with an external group clearly defined (Adamson *et al.*, 2007). But social identities can be fluid or stable depending on the context, whereas ethnic and political identities are remarkably stable over time compared to other social and political attitudes.

7. National identity vs. identity nationalism

National identities historically and politically funded provide their group members with legitimacy and esteem but arouse strong contestations from groups with different identity proposals. Assumed identity gains thus access to relevant institutions to satisfy personal and group needs.

We make a necessary distinction nowadays between patriotism and nationalism. A patriot feels bound to his country by loyalty and supports the democratic and constitutional principles, while the nationalist feels that his country is superior to other nations and has negative attitudes towards minorities, immigrants, and other nations (Largo, 2009).

National identities are considered the very foundation of peace and international cooperation but within functional interdependent communities may cause unrest. For some, the national identity provides them with a sense of dignity and a basis for cooperation whereas for others is a ground for social categorization and discrimination. But cultural roots must generate loyalty by self-defining in national terms and ethnic centrism must turn into patriotism. Otherwise, the nation as we know it ceases to exist.

By patriotism, we understand the love for our country and sacrifices we are held to take for defending the country and democracy, whereas nationalism means hostility towards others. Does attachment to ethnic groups necessarily associates with intolerance and conflict? We think the answer is negative, since members of the ethnic groups will seek, at times, to acquire membership statute in a larger outgroup defined against a different “otherness”.

Some of the identity-related phenomena should be understood through the lens of globalization. Defined by global changes of products, services, money, persons, information, and culture, globalization must be understood as a set of processes without a linear logic evolution that impacts in various degrees societies and sometimes redefines state functions by weakening it. On the group level, exposure to globalization increases self-consciousness concerning national borders and uniqueness of their in-group, fuelling xenophobe attitudes. Though the meaning of the national identity has been altered by culturally different waves of immigrants, its continuity is secured by the need people feel for an organized public life and a sense of belonging. On the population level, globalization has two



main effects: a part of the said population becomes more cosmopolitan whereas the other part develops resistive identities, directly derived from the national identity.

National identity has several dimensions: national identification, patriotism, nationalism, national ethnic identity, and availability for sacrifice (Herrmann *et al.*, 2009). The identity creates borders to separate the self from otherness and anticipates the way a member of a political, religious, or national group shall behave, think or assess while in relevant situations. The psychology of a social actor is not unchangeable. His identification may become positive by social interactions that create values, norms, beliefs, attitudes, and stereotypes at cognitive, affective, and motivational levels (Chalets, 1998).

We tend to believe that instrumental rationality can explain most of the people behaviours and actions. Max Weber has added values-oriented rationality to explain morally driven social behaviours. Neither of these can thoroughly explain the actions of Islamic terrorists which are not in pursuit of territorial or material gains. We need to consider in this case their religious faith and identity, together with emotions and resentments associated with Islamic fundamentalism. There is a direct cause-effect pattern in the relationship between interests and identities. Whenever identities are set, and interests are not clear, the cause is to be searched in interests, while identities are fluid and interests very clear, then the cause should be searched in identities.

We assume that our national identity is produced by historical, legal, and cultural forces and reflects who we are as citizens versus who the immigrants are as outsiders. The way the national identity is substantiated plays a significant role, though. When ideology underlies the national identity, belonging to the national group entails assuming a set of abstract and transcendent values such as freedom and democracy. When the cultural inheritance underlies the national identity, belonging to the same group means to assume some self-descriptive traits. That is why some immigrants face a conundrum. If they feel their belonging to the new nation's identity is ideologically funded, they will express their attachment to the new identity as a validation of their values. If they need a culturally funded belonging to a national identity, they will consider the new identity as a threat to the uniqueness of his former identity, defined by specific traits and traditions.

Following the same criteria, we may identify a pattern on how countries grant citizenship to newcomers. Countries with ethnic and cultural inheritance underlying the national identity and belonging to the identity group are by similarity with the rest of the group members granting citizenship by *jus sanguini*, by descending from other citizens. On the other hand, countries with ideology supported identity perceive a potential adherence if the characteristic values are shared and citizenship is granted by *jus soli*. Laws by which citizenship is granted are cultural elements and shows the way citizens understand and express their national identity.

Narratives embodied in the religious discourse that glorify the past use cultural and religious rituals, symbols, and myths, aim to provide the identity group with a guide for future actions. Past events are described in major key; religious

revelations become national celebrations; historical and archaeological evidence are manipulated so that the identity group has a territorial right against the negative, stereotypical other.

Nationalism itself is based on the concept of an individual with historically specific traits as a part of a united and self-sufficient entity. The ethnos so built, together with the related historical narrative within an imagined geographical territory help establishing the national identity. Individual attributes deriving from these narratives are meant to guide any future social and political actions, but their existence is meaningful only in the national identity's context.

There are many similar characteristics of religion and nationalism, and that is one of the reasons they sometimes associate. Both require an abstract and monolithic structure, unique and stable that delivers answers to a permanent need for security. Once institutionalized, both become interested in maintaining control over the population and social institutions within a defined territory. Both can provide ontological answers for questions about the surrounding world, identity self-referencing, and the existence of an "other" which is automatically excluded if he doesn't agree with the official "truth". Nationalist and religious leaders have the same preferred speech topics: declining morality, loss of ethic values, and increased corruption, and similar solutions: returning to the traditional community and the past according to religious or historical writings (Stryker *et al.*, 2013).

When confronted with globalization, migrations, and demographic changes, states need to resume identification and national identity issues. On the international level, they fight for recognition and some for integration. As a result, a new collective identity is formed to which states tend to align (Wendt). New transformations are entailed on the social level concerning the habitus, on the political level concerning identities and borders, and on the economic level concerning local development.

8. Identity politics in nation states

The nation-state is still the most powerful polity in world politics and the only one that exerts a sovereign political authority over a territory and a human community sharing a common future and values and holds the monopoly of legal violence. States enforce their identity politics by violence in the following cases: suppressing national movements within its borders, punishing neighbouring states that harbour national groups opposing them, and supporting a dominant national group against minorities when fighting over institutions and resources control. (Greenhill, 2008)

Once the Cold War ended, identity politics couldn't use any more as "otherness" a capitalist or communist reference, so it had to relate to a national "other". Once the supra-national structures disappeared, state politics had to deal with internal cleavages and transfrontier national minorities. Where states couldn't deal efficiently with capital flows, energy markets, criminality, and migrants issues, new political institutions occurred aiming to undermine the state's symbolic significance and authority over the nation. The more cyber-connected and more



politically efficient individuals are, the less effective is the state in meeting their demands and control their political behaviour. The only response they have is identity politics, aimed at validating the state legitimacy and authority.

One of the possible ways to study the relationship between the national identity and the foreign policy actions is by two cultural concepts, namely the national fondness and chauvinism, respectively. People believe they belong to a particular nation for various reasons: the way elites understand the national identity, language and culture similarities within a given population, economic and social communication networks, geographical location, state's aptness to maintain control, shared racial traits or religious beliefs (Mercer, 2014).

By national fondness, we understand the feeling of an individual that belongs to a nation and this helps him define himself on a cognitive and emotional level. Not to be confused with pride, which is specific to chauvinism. Belonging to a national group entails establishing borders apart from territorial borders or citizenship. Some consider the nation as a community delimited by cultural traits acquired by birth; others consider the nation as a community wilfully joined by shared faith in civic principles. By identifying with a nation, apart from assuming borders and differentiation from other, an individual is bound to compare his nation with other competing nations, through the agency of an emotional process, not a cognitive one. The more attached he becomes to his nation, the more inclined to discriminate and develop antipathy against foreigners of all type (Manners *et al.*, 1998).

Technology and economy related realities make easier for individuals to control, challenge, and manipulate identity constructions. Identity and its social or political meanings are thus modified from the character and strength standpoint fluently. In traditional cultures, societies were formed by direct interaction with neighbours, and individuals had little margin concerning personal choices due to strong customs and norms. In modern societies, individuals can define and redefine their identities due to global communication technologies and markets, rising thus above their society. Throughout the modern political history, the sovereign state has been the dominant institution. The nation has been the politically relevant identity group, but nowadays both are challenged. Political authority of the state is challenged by transnational corporations and international organizations, whereas the national identity is questioned by alternative identities, such as ethnic and religious ones.

The modern European state is conventionally called Westphalic since its beginnings are rooted in the treaty with the same denomination. Modern European nations were though developed later and in many places the nation was formed before the state, a fact that has repercussions until this very day regarding the pre-existing identities such as religious and social ones. Still, even if individuals maintained multiple identities, populations allegiance was directed mostly towards the territorial state, evolving from the status of subjects to national citizens. European states have strived by coercion to provide stable identity borders, within which hierarchical connections were replaced with a conventional space under the

rule of law. Citizenship based identity came to prominence only when the nation and the state have coalesced into a single powerful identity.

States can tolerate multiple political identities and proven lenience towards treating the “other” non-violently depending on the political regime type and institutional legitimacy foundation. Even for an ideal type of nation-state where all individuals embrace the same national identity, there are always hidden identities, politically significant, that may resurface whenever dominant authorities are most vulnerable. (Weaver, 1995).

The identity card is easy to play with every opportunity and nationalism is always ready to politically manipulate masses depending on which identity markers are prominent in the nations’ construction. The social group called nation provides its members with an exclusive identity and unites them in a morally bound community by stating ethic obligations among the members but not extending them to individuals outside the group. The nation’s foundation may be built on blood ties, common history or descendants, language, unique cultural institutions, religion, or shared political institutions. Every nation funds its construction on a combination of identity markers such as language, blood, culture, religion, or citizenship in various degrees of intensity throughout time, with the primary purpose of defining an “us” different from “them”.

When the primary identity marker is blood, the biological factor is considered the leading leverage in the competition for resources with other bloodlines. In such cases, nations consider danger was only coming from outside the country, never from inside. The “otherness” inside is just defiling of the very essence of the nation, its’ blood lineage.

Nations, where the main identity marker is the language, are only concerned about preserving the language as they identify it with national identity itself. In this case, there is no concern for ethnic purity but significant preoccupation concerning education system and media. Such countries will always be suspicious about transnational authorities or initiatives.

When the main identity marker is culture, the nation’s primary concern is to continuously prove its’ culture superior status compared to “others”, and main threat is new generations’ choice in favour of behaviours different from their culture of birth. Other cultures are tolerated if only are obviously inferior or primitive. Such states are usually building empires in the name of an assumed “civilizing” mission.

At the inter-state level, identity markers’ influence is of paramount importance. Countries not sharing a certain number of identity markers may perceive each other’s actions as potential threats and be less prone to cooperation, whereas if their identity markers are similar, fear and hostility are mitigated. Of course, these considerations are valid just for nations without exclusive identities. Such countries will find cooperation a problematic task if are separated by religion, culture, or language.

According to Hegel, modern states’ cohesion is not just the result of language, culture, or religion-based identities. Another binding factor is the common loyalty of the citizens towards the central authority which in turn offers



them common defense (Kinnvall, 2004). Collective identity is thus a result of external conflicts and citizens' sacrifices. Members of the national group become self-conscious due to the conflict and peace may result only by negotiation between the states.

From the structural and functional perspectives, groups are formed as a result of the fight over resources, by projecting hostility and violence against competing groups combined with pride, loyalty, and superiority towards their in-group. Some recent studies show the existence of a so-called "subtle racism", defined as a lack of positive feelings regarding the minority groups, without referencing them according to strong negative stereotypes (Manners *et al.*, 1998). Subtle racism rewards the group members with primacy and favouritism in comparison to other groups, without asking in return for manifest loyalty towards their group or assumed negative stereotypes concerning individuals from outside the group. Discrimination occurs only when groups compete for resources or political power. In proportion as groups grow more extensive and more impersonal, institutions and customs supposed to uphold members' loyalty tend to become moral authorities. External groups have a chance to be recognised and tolerated if they promote similar standards and values in their pursuit of positive distinction from the reference group.

9. Towards a new policy on citizenship in EU

Modern states include the nationality in the citizenship, and all group members must abide by the principles of collective freedom and equality that underlie this construct. These states never talk about racism, but they use the term "cultural distance" instead. Immigrants, especially those with illegal or quasi-illegal statutes are deprived of fundamental social rights such as unemployment support, health insurance, or child allowances in the name of a "national preference" and treated according to arbitrary criteria depending on the tolerance and integration capacity of the host nation. Hence is established institutional racism with a stronger influence on collective attitudes than nationalism itself.

European citizenship is one of the critical objectives mentioned in founding treaties of EU. So far it means a statute of inherited nationality within a member state of EU. To reach what it is meant to be, in the future European nations will have to adapt the social and political rights associated with the modern citizenship. On a first level, the member nations will have to recognize supranational institutions as legitimate. It is hard to believe that people will accept that if they don't feel provided with the same level of security and democratic participation as in their traditional states. On a second level, all states should accept as a basis for granting the citizenship status the principle of *jus soli*. Otherwise building a democratic model on a continental scale would not be possible since every European nation has its system of exclusions associated with the citizenship.

Is such a shared democratic model and principles going to be a threat to the national citizenship? We think not, even if it will be a significant challenge for the

current absolutist and exclusive conception of the notion. In a first step, we will have to understand and accept the difference between social citizenship and being a member of a nation as so far are considered inseparable. The second step consists of revising the rights customarily gained by birth, mainly the right to be represented and participate in the public social life and assign them also to the naturalized individuals. We think this could be an excellent basis for a democratic coexistence in the spirit of a modern EU and social construction that can withstand the test of time and whatever challenges the future is preparing for us.

What consequences are to be anticipated if this simple two-step model shall not be applied? In our opinion, throughout the entire EU, we could see rekindled a particular form of apartheid, with various intensities depending on each area's cultural identity. Such apartheid is expected to generate conflicts of a specific nature (Habermas, 2001), induced by two primary forms of violence, namely the ideological one and the institutional one, respectively.

The ideological violence is expected to come from nationalist groups and marginal individuals inspired by the aforementioned groups and directed towards non-European residents, whereas the institutional violence may come from the authorities empowered with the use of legitimate violence but this time exerted beyond the legal threshold. The victims of the discrimination are in their turn expected to retort with reactive violence. It is a common statistical knowledge (Nathan, 2006) that such reactive violence is rarely coming from immigrants with uncertain legal status but mostly from young people belonging to families naturalized one or two generations before when confronted with social and professional exclusion or administrative racism in a general context of debased social relations.

An answer of the nation-states is to emphasise some facts and minimize others, create categories of "usual suspects" or "scapegoats". Such behaviour may work on a national level, but it is tough to legitimate on a European level without a universal police institution that would control and eventually disband the national law enforcement authorities.

The glitch is to be found in the very construction of the EU, which was built without the social component. Adding this to the EU means, among others, to allow a new type of public space over decentralised states, where new transnational associative movements would maneuver, including powerful labour unions.

EU was meant from the beginning to become an organizing and civilizing power at a regional level and has proven that in a certain extent when it had to deal with integration, association, and reciprocity processes associated with its Eastern extension. The prize was the mobility on the labour market, but that entailed associated drawbacks: dramatic population movements and regional impoverishments.

Is there a solution to all such problems? We believe that one of the possible ways is to legalize a "right of establishment" as a preliminary statute before granting citizenship. For that to be viable, first EU should progressively extend the political rights of all residents no matter their nationality at local and national levels until complete liberalization of labour and residence rights.



Migrants should be granted full citizenship only after demonstrating their adherence to EU fundamental values and active integration in the society. Specialized social workers should regularly check their economic and social integration along a probation period of no less than five years and make thorough recommendations to the relevant state authorities regarding the future statute of each migrant. Throughout the same period of time, the assigned social workers should protect the migrants against institutional racism and assist them in any rightful endeavour.

Conclusions

When members of a particular political community, democratically united, use as self-referencing the collective determination, we need to ask ourselves at what level operates the eventual exclusion from the “community of citizens”. One of the state’s functions is to control the extent and emancipation of the civic society. Without the state as the provider of citizenship, real political rights and a recognition status it is hard to imagine a community with the same attributes outside of a “universal republic”.

Citizenship would become then active participation of individuals in the politics within an integrating community. Individual dignity would be no more determined by their position inside the statutory group but by their universal character as human being and citizen.

The logic of exclusion has changed methods throughout the time as often as the historical space has changed. Today, the nation-states usually exclude wholly or partially those included most recently in the social rights and citizenship network by disaffiliation. New integrations or exclusions are performed on fundamentally racist rules and regulations basis, with an aim to separate wanted from unwanted immigrants.

Human rights are not innate moral truths but constructs with a mandatory character from the political point of view since these are legal rights as opposed to moral rights. As individual subjective rights, their legal nature is inherent and part of the positive rights of every human being. But respective laws cannot solve anything unless they generate an abstract form of civic solidarity that helps fulfil the underlying rights.

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