

NATO-EU PARTNERSHIP: FOSTERING RESILIENCE FOR A COOPERATIVE SECURITY SPACE

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Abstract

Present events indicate an encompassing process of multi-level changes - political, military, economic, and technological that highlights the idea that we are going through a phase of transition at systemic level that is redesigning the structure of power of the 21st century. This paper will try to find out first if the cooperative security concept can be seen as a security theory according to Baldwin's criteria and second if NATO's partnership policy in general and the NATO EU partnership in particular can foster resilience. The objectives of this article are to envisage the role of the NATO-EU partnership in the future by: reviewing the theoretical approaches on cooperative security, analysing NATO's partnership policy, analysing the ability of NATO-EU partnership to foster resilience.

Keywords: resilience, cooperative security, NATO-EU partnership

Introduction

Although it is highly debated whether the international system has changed since the end of the Cold War and modified its structure from a bi-polar to a uni-polar or a multipolar one, the majority of the big actors are expecting a change within the structure of the international system.

Recent events in the international environment seem to indicate two important trends: the first one is the increasing tendency of the two great revisionist powers, the Russian Federation and China to change the present world order and the second one is the lack of ability or of will of the democratic world and especially of the USA to maintain the present world order and the dominant position gained in 1945 (Kaplan, 2017).

At a global level, these evolutions can be explained through the transition of power theory that shows a redistribution of power at global level (Modelski, 1987). The phase of transition implies that "the tectonic plates of the global structure are moving" (Secares, 2014) and a new geopolitical map will arise from the confrontation for power between the most important poles. According to the hegemonic cycle theory, we are in a stage of transition to a new cycle of power,

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“translated into a real tough game of power and power politics, shaping the new hegemonic structure of the 21st century” (Secares, 2014). This argument is also supported by the concept developed by Barry Buzan (2011) - ‘decentred globalism’ – stating that the international system suffered a series of modifications towards a system characterized by a diffuse distribution of power, simultaneously manifesting as a highly integrated/interdependent global system.

Apart from the fact that the system has changes already or it will change in the near future is still disputed, important aspects of these changes are clear. During the 1990s we faced the prospect of continued expansion, meaning that the liberal system will continue for the next decades, but surprisingly, the XXIst century marked a return to a realist logic due to the fact that “expectations about the future of an international system based on liberal ideas emphasizing democracy and human rights seem much less certain” (Waever, 2014)

In this context, the main actors try to adapt to these changes; states redesigned its foreign policies, new formats of cooperation appeared, the G 20 for example, and international institutions adapted their mission. Along its history, there have been multiple debates about NATO’s crisis and whether they will affect the alliance in such a manner that will lead to its disappearance. Of course, a clarification of what we define as a crisis is important, in the sense that if we define crisis as a time of increased tension or a point where cooperation becomes difficult, we can affirm that NATO has overcome many crisis. (Thiess, 2009) The same author argues that the crises NATO has encountered have become a part of the Alliance’s existence, and they underlined the necessity to focus on new forms of cooperation in order to maintain NATO’s relevance and viability. NATO has managed to overcome the debates concerning its relevance or the fact that NATO should “retire” (Drent *et al.*, 2011) after the disappearance of its main threat – the soviet expansion - as it has managed to adapt to the new challenges and threats. Furthermore, crisis might be triggering strategic changes, generate new institutional practices that can ultimately reform the present liberal world order.

The EU on its turn is facing many challenges like the Centre – Periphery debate, two speed Europe, the euro-crisis, the BREXIT, the wave of populist movements, terrorist attacks, the refugee’s crisis.

We also need to consider the impact of divergent factors such as the rise of emerging powers, the revisionist actions of the Russian Federation and China in their regions, the new American foreign policy and an increasing influence of non-state actors that are challenging the ability of main powers – especially NATO and the EU, to respond. Given this international context, this article resides on cooperative security to find out whether partnerships foster resilience.

Motivation of research:

The article inquires whether cooperative security is a security theory according to Baldwin’s criteria and how can cooperative security respond to the



present international environment? The secondary research question inquires whether NATO's partnership policy in general and the NATO-EU partnership in particular fosters resilience.

This paper seeks first to explain how cooperative security – as a security theory – can manage the present changes/challenges, second to explain how can resilience be fostered through partnerships. The specific objectives aim at a literature review of the theoretical approaches on cooperative security, analyzing the cooperative security concept according to Baldwin's criteria, analysing the strategic documents establishing the NATO EU partnership through the comparative method (which will be described in the methodological considerations section), analyzing the ability of partnerships and especially of the NATO-EU partnership to foster resilience by performing an operationalization of the resilience concept (in the methodological considerations section) and seeing if the indicators of resilience reflect in the documents establishing the NATO EU partnership, in the case study.

The theoretical framework of this article is underpinned by the concept of cooperative security (that encompasses four rings of security - individual security, collective security, collective defence and promoting stability) in order to prove that the NATO-EU partnership will broaden and strengthen the area of Cooperative Security that is managed now only by NATO.

The first hypothesis states that if the cooperative security concept can explain what security is and how security can be achieved, then it can be a security theory. This hypothesis will be tested by applying the analysis grid of A Baldwin (Baldwin, 1997) to the concept of cooperative security, in the case study.

The second hypothesis states that if partnerships are established, then resilience is fostered. This is a directional and positive hypothesis. I will test it by operationalising the concept of resilience and analyse how the indicators reflect in the strategic documents establishing the NATO EU Partnership, in the case study.

1. Theoretical and methodological approaches

In this section dedicated to theoretical and methodological approaches I will motivate why I choose the cooperative security approach and I will review the literature that offers various perspectives on cooperative security, trying to define it and to find out whether it fulfils the conditions of a security theory. In the methodological part I will operationalise the concept of resilience in order to establish the dimensions, variables and indicators. Then, I will explain the comparative method which I will use in the study case in order to see if the indicators of resilience reflect in the strategic documents establishing the NATO EU Partnership.

1.1. Theoretical approaches

The field of international relations is an ever-changing arena of numerous actors which interact with each other in a multitude of ways having various



outcomes and consequences on different levels, ranging from global to national, from regional to local. It is therefore understandable that over time we have developed just as many theories and approaches which seek to make sense, analyze and predict the dynamism of the international system.

The changes of the international system and also the new types of actors in international relations have questioned the ability of the main theories to explain current evolution in the transatlantic context and generated new approaches and concepts. Starting from these assumptions I rely the paper on the cooperative security concept.

The endeavour to expose a concept from the policy area to the theoretical criteria is challenging even for the most influential theorists on security studies (Waever, 2014). For the purpose of this paper I will analyze the NATO's cooperative security concept from an academic perspective and will connect it to the NATO-EU partnership. In this respect I will define it from a theoretical point of view and see if it is a security theory, meaning if it explains what is security and how security can be achieved through cooperative security. Afterwards I will place it at systemic level and try to see how will the concept apply in practice, in the present international environment.

Arnold Wolfers (1952, p. 485) considers that security is “the absence of threat to acquired values”, although this is a contested concept (Baldwin, 1997) due to the debates on its meaning.

Ole Waever (2014) states that on the one side, a security concept should be “assessed in terms of its ability to play a key role in an explanatory theory or to clarify the essence of security in a manner that makes it possible to deduce the response to specific challenges”. On the other side, mentioning the UN view, he states that a security concept should be designed “to be a guide and to provide a structure – even a vision – to crystallize decisions and policies” (Waever, 2014, p. 48). Briefly, a concept of security should focus on making a statement on the nature of security, and on how to implement it.

When defining security, Wolfers (1940) refers to the fact that security means the existence of guarantees and protection.

According to realist framework, the “international arena remains an anarchical, self-help system, a brutal arena where states look for opportunities to take advantage of each other” (Mearsheimer, 1995, p. 5) in order to increase the security of their own citizens. In this context, it is important to mention the assumption that states are entitled to aspire to survival and development, and relations established with the external environment have the purpose to support this objective (Melescanu and Cioculescu, 2010).

Buzan (2007) mixes conceptual analyze with empirical observations stating that security at individual level is connected to security at state level and at international level. Ullman (1983) argues that a comprehensive definition of security should clarify what should be given up in order to obtain more security and that we do not know what security is until we are threatened to lose it. Gray



(1977) considers that despite the numerous definitions, there are opinions that no concept can be preferred over the other. However, the neorealist approach considers this is the most important concept for a state (Waltz, 1979). Although neorealists do not agree with Wolfers's definition, they do not contest it (Baldwin, 1997, p. 11).

In the attempt to define the concept it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that authors like Ashton Carter, William Perry and John Steinbruner (1992, p. 4) state that "organizing principles like deterrence, nuclear stability and containment embodied the aspirations of the cold war" while "Cooperative security is the corresponding principle for international security in the post Cold War era". Meaning that, this shift signified escaping from the narrow Cold War zero sum game strategies into a broader space for international peace and harmony. Nonetheless we should question ourselves how enduring is a transition from a world based on the balance of power to a world based on politics of shared risks.

Another important definition is the one offered by Gareth Evans (1994, p. 7), who states that cooperative security tends to "connote consultation rather than confrontation, reassurance rather than deterrence, transparency rather than secrecy, prevention rather than correction and interdependence rather than unilateralism".

We should have into consideration the fact that at the centre of cooperative security is the human rights concept, as human security is in the centre of any security theory designed around liberal and democratic values. In this respect, Bill McSweeney (1999, p. 16) states that "security must make sense at the basic level of the individual human being for it to make sense at the international level".

One of the most important works on cooperative security is the one of Robert Cohen (2001) who envisions cooperative security as a strategic system, as a security community, in other words as "a nucleus of liberal democratic states". I reside this paper of this statement and will refer to the Euro Atlantic community in the sense of a practical and transparent cooperation, a web of security. Cohen (2001) defines cooperative security as "a strategic system which forms around a nucleus of liberal democratic states linked together in a network of formal or informal alliances and institutions". In his attempt to identify the main characteristics of this concept, he refers to "shared values and practical and transparent economic, political and defence cooperation". If I refer at NATO as a security community I should state that NATO members did not intend this from the beginning, it rather evolved as a result of interactions and relations, common cultural values, democratic political practices (Ungureanu, 2006, p. 248).

Based on these definitions, cooperative security is a consequence of a security community, due to the fact that is forgoing and modifying the pursuit of individual national interest for the sake of the longer term common good.

Cohen's (2001, p. 1) contribution resides in the fact that he stated that "in a cooperative security system, individual states' national interests are linked by four reinforcing rings of security". In defining these rings (Cohen, 2001, p. 10), he argues that the first ring refers to individual security as "promoting and



protecting human rights within their own boundaries and further afield”; the second ring refers to collective security and the author resumes it “maintaining peace and stability within their common space”; the third ring refers to collective defence as “mutual protection against outside aggression”; and finally, the fourth ring, promoting stability is defined as “actively promoting stability in other areas where conflict could threaten their shared security, using political, informational, economic and, if necessary, military means”. Based on this model, he argues that, although many international organization function based on collective security and collective defence, only NATO fulfils the conditions for the cooperative security. As far as the EU is concerned, he states that the Union is becoming a cooperative security organization and together with NATO it brings security and prosperity in its vicinity (Cohen, 2001, p. 2), opinion shared also in this paper.

In his attempt to have a theoretical approach on the concept, Mihalka (2001, p. 35) argued that “cooperative security is activity among states to lessen the likelihood of war, or its consequences should it occur, that is not directed at any specific state or group of states”. He identified the ‘Concert of Europe’ as an early model of cooperative security, showing that the concept is a transformative one and that it evolved in the last two centuries. When referring to the former international security organizations, he argues that the League of Nations failed because it could not evolve into a security community (Mihalka, 2001, p. 6). When talking about the UN, he states that it was designed as a collective security system and could be a cooperative security model. He states that the League of Nations and the Concert of Europe prove that security communities and cooperative security systems could be possible among non-liberal democratic states, but these are not stable security communities.

Further, we will analyze the cooperative security concept according to a number of criteria developed by Baldwin (Baldwin, 1997) to see if it actually is a concept of security. By and large, the answers referring to the cooperative security concept are based on NATO’s understanding of the policy concept expressed in the Strategic Concept from 2010.

Security for whom? Buzan (2007) considers that the answer depends on the research question. The cooperative security concept refers to individuals, states, members of the alliance and the outside world.

Security for which values? Wolfers (1952) adds to the debate the subjective and objective dimension of security. Our concept refers to democratic and liberal values.

How much security? Brodie (1950) and Wolfers (1952) questions whether we should even measure security. Our concept may respond to this question if we take into consideration the ring of projecting stability.

From what threats? Baldwin (1997, p. 15) adds to the list of conventional threats even natural disasters. The cooperative security concept refers to traditional threats, but also specifies the new type of threats like hybrid war, cyber war, etc.



By what means? Wolfers (1952) mentions military solutions to security problems. The cooperative security concept proves that adapted the response at the present security environment referring to military, intelligence and surveillance, pre-emptive and preventive measures, crisis management, post conflict stabilization, etc.

At what cost? Baldwin (1997) states that costs matter in the measure that these resources could be otherwise used in other purposes. Indeed the concept mentions budgetary costs and priorities.

During the years, the concept evolved from guarantees and protection to defence and afterwards to extraordinary measures.

As previously stated, the challenge is how to construct a realistic and effective approach or implementation of cooperative security. And the answer could be found when studying the system based on institutions and mechanisms that prove themselves effective in providing relative peace, stability and prosperity.

If we refer to NATO's understanding of this concept, it is only one of its three core concepts stated in the New Strategic Concept together with collective defence and crisis management. But cooperative security receives the highest importance because is the most ambitious and far reaching one. The collective security concept is a constant of NATO's strategic concepts and as well as crisis management it was already institutionalized. The fact that this concept should be approached in report with order, power constellations and institutions means that nowadays we talk about a picture where liberal institutions are at the core of a world order.

As the cooperative security concept as developed by NATO fulfilled all the conditions of a security theory developed by Baldwin, although not perfectly, I can argue that the first hypothesis was confirmed, with the mention that more efforts should be put in implementing the concept.

1.2. Methodological considerations

The research methodology is based on a descriptive and an analytical approach. I use a descriptive approach to provide a review of the most influential theories on security and the cooperative security concept. The paper uses qualitative analysis for most of the sources and comparative analysis for the case study. Further, I will operationalise the resilience concept in order to see if the indicators reflect in the documents establishing the NATO EU partnership and to test the second hypothesis. Afterwards, I will explain what is the comparative method and how I will perform the comparative analysis of the documents establishing the NATO-EU partnership.



Operationalizing the concept of “resilience”:

When operationalizing the concept of resilience for the purpose of our paper, the challenge is how to define it, assess it, enhance it.

When establishing an encompassing definition, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that resilience is directed “against the full spectrum of threats, including hybrid threats, from any direction” and should insure “essential basis for credible deterrence and defence and effective fulfilment of the Alliance’s core tasks” (NATO, 2016)

According to the European Commission, resilience is “the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to withstand, cope, adapt, and quickly recover from stresses and shocks such as violence, conflict, drought and other natural disasters without compromising long-term development” (European Commission, 2016). Resilience is meant to foster the North Alliance’s long term adaptation based on a series of objectives: “maintain and protect critical civilian capabilities, alongside and in support of military capabilities, and to work across the whole of government and with the private sector” (NATO, 2016).

When setting the dimensions of the concept is necessary to have into consideration the military sphere, the civil one and the hybrid threats one.

The variables we should have into consideration are the cyber sphere, hybrid threats, civil-military readiness, cooperation with the EU.

The indicators used for the purpose of our paper are derived from NATO’s priorities (Shea, 2016):

1. government continuity and basic services
2. resilient energy security
3. capacity to manage people’s mobility
4. resilient resources of food and water
5. resilient systems of communications
6. resilient systems of transportation

I will use these indicators to see if they reflect in the documents analysed in the case study.

The cooperation with the EU is essential mainly because NATO should “continue to engage, as appropriate, with international bodies, particularly the European Union, and with partners” (NATO, 2016).

Although the evolution of the cyberspace is unpredictable and there are numerous debates on whether to regulate this space, we must start from the fact that at the Warsaw Summit, the cyber space was declared operational.

I consider that civil military readiness is a variable because in time of war, critical infrastructures are essential and nowadays, most of these facilities are owned by the civil sector, so one of NATO’s goals is to “improve civil preparedness”.



The NATO-EU cooperation in particular is considered a variable because its evolution impacts on the ability to build resilience and to create a cooperative security space. Eloquent in this regard is the following statement:

We will protect our populations and territory by strengthening continuity of government, continuity of essential services and security of critical civilian infrastructure; and we will work to ensure that our national and NATO military forces can at all times be adequately supported with civilian resources, including energy, transportation, and communications. This will include NATO support to assess and, upon request, facilitate national progress (NATO, 2016).

Also the Alliance has set other goals in building resilience, like the supporting national critical infrastructures against cyber-attacks and protection against Chemical Biological Radioactive Nuclear attacks through investments in interoperability.

To sum up, I will use the indicators established above in the case study in order to see how resilience reflects in the documents establishing the NATO EU partnership.

The Comparative method:

In this methodological section is necessary to define and explain the comparative method and the way I will use in in the case study.

I will reside my research on the understanding given by Lijphart, who argues that the comparative method is one of the basic scientific methods, along with the experimental, the statistic and the case study one “of establishing general empirical propositions” (Lijphart, 1971, p. 682). Lijphart argues that it represents a method, while Eisenstadt states that the term is rather referring to a broader approach than a specific method (Lijphart, 1971, p. 682). For Lijphart the comparative method does not equal with the scientific method as it is narrow in scope and it aims at “discovering empirical relationships among variables”, not at measuring something. However, authors like Sartori (1970, p. 1033) or Kalleberg (1966, p. 72) consider it as a measurement method as it means nonmetrical ordering or ordinal measurement. Sartori uses the metaphor of the man that is aware of the limitations imposed by not having a thermometer but can still make the difference between hot and cold. For Lijphart, the comparative method refers to the step of finding relationships between variables, not to the step of measuring them, which is previous. He considers the comparative method a general, broader method rather than a specialized technique. Some critiques (Goldschmidt, 1966, p. 4) claim that this is rather an approach as it lacks the preciseness of a method. The comparative method resembles the statistical one but differs from it in the sense that is used for limited/small number of cases and it cannot allow cross tabulations or other control



systems. When talking about the critiques of this method, it is important to mention the large number of possible variables and the small number of cases. Another critique refers to the risk of giving too much importance to negative findings, or the risk of quotation/illustration methodology, meaning one selects the cases in accordance with the hypothesis and the hypothesis is rejected if one deviant case is found. In this paper I will not select the cases based on a specific criteria, but refer to the existing strategic documents. One solution for solving the “many variables, small N” problem is to increase the number of cases either geographically or cross-historical. In my case I will prefer the cross-historical option, choosing strategic documents from different periods of time. Another solution is to reduce the “property space of the analysis”, meaning to combine variables that are similar into a single one. I will also use this solution, choosing the most relevant variables.

This paper employs the *comparative analysis* of the strategic documents establishing the NATO-EU relations, the 2002 NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP, the “Berlin Plus” agreements, the 2010 Strategic Concept and the Communiqué of the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016. The selection of these documents has been done according to the following criteria: the impact of the international system, differences from the previous strategic document, recurring trends, progress since the last strategic document. The purpose of this comparison is to study the evolution of the NATO EU partnership, in the following case study

2. The evolution/role of the NATO-EU partnership in fostering resilience for a cooperative security space. Comparative analysis of the strategic documents establishing the NATO-EU relations (the 2002 NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP, the “Berlin Plus” agreements, the 2010 Strategic Concept and the Communiqué of the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016)

The purpose of this case study is to envisage the importance of partnerships in fostering resilience, with a special focus on the NATO – EU partnership. The method will reside in a comparative analysis of the main documents institutionalizing these partnership based on a set of criteria. Finally, we will see how the indicators established in the methodological section reflect in these documents, especially in the Warsaw Summit Communiqué – document that reflects most of the indicators previously established.

NATO-EU cooperation should represent the norm, the rule, not the exception, as they are different organizations, but defence is vital for both. We should have in mind also the fact that EU has a series of instruments that are not among NATO’s tasks – economic, diplomatic and normative.

The NATO – EU relation has deep roots and is based on a previous series of achievements (NATO, 2017). The beginning of this partnership can be identified in February 1992 when the EU adopts the Maastricht Treaty, and the intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Also, a potential framework of a common defence policy (ESDP) together with the WEU is



discussed, concerning the EU's defence pillar, as NATO and WEU strengthen their cooperation. In June 1992, In Oslo, a meeting of NATO foreign ministers discuss on transforming the WEU as a European pillar of the Alliance and in the same time as a defence element of the EU, which could be in charge with the "Petersberg tasks". Further, the collective capabilities of the alliance are put at the disposition of WEU operations and the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces is endorsed by the Alliance. In 1996 at NATO foreign ministers in Berlin (Berlin Plus) a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO is discussed both for improving European capabilities and to rebalance responsibilities and roles. The EU members continue their efforts to establish a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and in 1998 at St. Malo, France and the UK have a joint statement on this issue. The previously mentioned Berlin Plus agreements are subject of debate at the NATO Washington Summit in 1999 and the decision is to develop these arrangements. A concrete example is represented by the EU Helsinki Council in December 1999 when military goals to allow the EU to deploy troops up to 60.000 people until 2003 for Petersberg tasks. As some of the WEU attributes are transferred to the EU, and military structures within the EU are created, the WEU role decreases and becomes residual. The progress of the NATO-EU relations is discussed for the first time in September 2000. Finally, in December 2000 the Nice Treaty establishes the ESDP as an independent policy. To sum up this brief historical track, this relationship is built on previous steps meant to increase the interoperability, to decrease the technological gap and to balance responsibilities, each task targeting of course at strengthening the collective defence mission of the Alliance.

In the next table I will underline evolution of the NATO-EU partnership after 2002, using the following criteria: the impact of the international system, differences from the previous strategic document, recurring trends, progress since the last strategic document.

Table 1. The evolution of the NATO-EU partnership after 2002

	The 2002 NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP	The "Berlin Plus" agreements,	The 2010 Strategic Concept	The Communiqué of the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016
The impact of the international system	January 2001: institutionalized relations -NATO - EU , May 2001: First NATO-EU meeting - common statement on the Western Balkans, November 2002: In the Prague Summit, NATO states declare their capacity to give the EU access to NATO	March 2003: implementation of a NATO-EU security of information agreement, May 2003: First meeting of the NATO-EU Capability Group, November 2003: First joint NATO-EU crisis-management exercise, December 2004:	France returns to the military structures in 2009, The foreign policy of the Obama administration, Lisbon Treaty and CFSP/ESDP, NATO's operations	2005-2010 Transatlantic informal NATO-EU ministerial dinner, Russia's action in Eastern Ukraine,



	capabilities for operations in which the Alliance is not engaged from a military perspective,	Beginning of the EU-led Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina.		
Differences from the previous strategic document	Establish the political principles underlying the relationship, enforce EU access to NATO's planning capabilities for the EU's own military operation	Establish the basis for the Alliance to support EU-led operations in which NATO as a whole is not engaged,	NATO's need to adapt, creating conditions for a non-nuclear world, Cyber attacks,	Set concrete areas of cooperation and concrete tasks, Cyber defense pledge, Resilience concept, Intelligence cooperation
Recurring trends	Partnership in crisis management, conflict prevention, mutual consultation, dialogue, cooperation,	NATO and the EU are cooperating to prevent conflicts within and outsidethe security community, common strategic goals,	Collective defense, Partnership cooperation, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance	Cooperation, transparency, Partnership policy, Collective defense,
Progress since the last strategic document.	Recognized the need for agreements to ensure the mutual support	Regular meetings, NATO decided to support EU-led operations that don't gave NATO engagement,	Crisis management, cooperative security, post conflict stabilization, contribution of partners to NATO operations	Joint tasks, areas for strengthened cooperation in the spirit of common challenges, managing hybrid threats

Source: the table is elaborated by the author based on NATO website¹

As we can notice, the first criteria, the international context was vital in setting the base of this partnership. The common threats that the two organizations faced made them realize that NATO is important for the EU as well as the EU is important for NATO. Along its history, NATO managed to overcome many crises, each of them being considered as “existential”. Former Deputy Secretary General G. Altenburg (2002) stated that NATO’s success was disguised in a perpetual crisis, meaning that NATO succeeded in coping with internal and external threats, this process of adaptation being one of its core characteristics. Similarly, the fate of the EU proved that each crisis made the Union stronger.

If we refer to NATO, France’s withdrawal from NATO in 1966, the debate in the early 80’s on deploying intermediate-range nuclear action forces in Europe, the challenges of the Balkan wars after the Cold War, the Georgian war in 2008, the Russian aggression in Ukraine are only some of the examples of events that NATO had to manage and that also triggered the need to adapt. If we refer to the EU, Every event has challenged the ability of the member states to reach consensus on controversial political issues and promoting at the same time their national interests.

The adaptation to the changing security environment and the strategic documents resulted have been influenced by some complementary variables such

¹ http://www.nato.int/cps/in/natohq/topics_49217.htm

as the national interest of member states, the connections with the rest of the world and the adaptation of military capabilities.

The second criteria, differences from the previous strategic document proves that this relationship evolved gradually, from recognizing the need to cooperate, to cooperating per se, afterwards institutionalizing the framework for cooperation and ultimately establishing the common tasks and area of cooperation.

The main differences reside in the fact that the NATO-EU declaration on ESDP established the political principles envisaging the relationship and also restated EU's "access to NATO's planning capabilities for the EU's own military operation" (EU NATO declaration on ESDP, 2002), while the Berlin Plus agreements "Set the basis for the Alliance to support EU-led operations in which NATO as a whole is not engaged" (Berlin Plus Agreements, 2002).

The debate upon the adoption of The Alliance's Strategic Concept "Active engagement, modern defence" in 2010 (Heads of State and Government, 2010) was favoured by a series of factors such as the returning of France to the military structures in 2009, the foreign policy of the Obama administration, and the implications of the Lisbon Treaty and of EU's CFSP/ESDP.

After a process of reflection, consultation and negotiation, NATO proved that it continues to belong to a 'community of values' (de Wijk, 2012, p. 149) but a debate on one of the central issues of NATO was raised. The old members of the Alliance want a new type of alliance designed to defend common interests through expeditionary missions, while new members from Central and Eastern Europe still emphasize the role collective defence for NATO territory (Pascu, 2014).

Moreover, through the new Strategic Concept, the Allies have committed to pursue the development of ten key capabilities for current and future missions of NATO, the lack of some of them was evident during the operation in Libya. According to the Concept, the Allies should have, at the horizon of 2020, the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the security of citizens of member states. Creating these capabilities, however, requires solidarity and cooperation between member states and organizations.

If we refer to recurring trends, the main drivers of this relationship were the common values and the need to cooperate in order to have a cooperative approach to threats that cannot be solved individually. These drivers translated into transparency measures, the common task of ensuring the peace and security of members and partners, crisis management and peaceful resolution of conflicts.

If we are to analyse the in-depth impact of the international security environment on this relationship, we notice that although the challenges of each period are very different, NATO's and EU's ability to adapt, to perform the necessary changes that lead to their transformation is enshrined in each of the strategic documents analyzed.

Another recurring provision concerns NATO's and EU's main objectives, the security of member state, that remains at the core of each Strategic concept and each treaty. Also, policies founded on dialogue and co-operation are a constant of



the strategic documents although the terms used to express it may differ, from dialogue to partnership.

Each document shows the progress made since the last one. The first document analyzed recognizes the need to cooperate, the following two ones set the conditions of interoperability while the latter established clear tasks. In 2010, the progress envisaged in the strategic document was represented by crisis management and cooperative security, post conflict stabilization, contribution of partners to NATO led operations.

As can be noticed from the analysis of these documents, the indicators resulted after the operationalization of “resilience” reflect in each of the documents analyzed in deferent degrees. The indicators are:

1. government continuity and basic services
2. resilient energy security
3. capacity to manage people’s mobility
4. resilient resources of food and water
5. resilient systems of communications
6. resilient systems of transportation

In the first and the second documents we can only find markers of the first two indicators, as both NATO and EU promote values of democracy, internal governmental stability and the state of law. Also, energy security is among the interests of both organization and the security of supplies, routes of transportation and conditions of trade represent a priority.

The following three indicators reflect specifically in the last two documents, meaning the Strategic Concept from 2010 and the Warsaw Summit Communiqué. The latter document dedicates a special attention to the NATO EU partnership and its ability to manage “challenges and threats of any kind and from any direction” (NATO, 2016). NATO has “agreed a strategy on NATO’s role in Countering Hybrid Warfare, which is being implemented in coordination with the EU” (NATO, 2016) with the purpose of countering hybrid warfare within collective defence. In respect with the indicators of resilient communication system, the Warsaw Communiqué states that the Alliance “will be capable of defending themselves in cyberspace as in the air, on land and at sea.” (NATO, 2016)

More specifically, the NATO EU partnership and all the indicators are transposed in the NATO EU Joint Declaration, which underlines the immediate need to “bolstering resilience, working together on analysis, prevention, and early detection, through timely information sharing and, to the extent possible, intelligence sharing between staffs; and cooperating on strategic communication and response” (NATO, 2016).

If we consider the American objectives regarding its foreign policy, namely the transition to a ‘multi-partner rather than a multi-polar’ (Waeber, 2014) world we could face a reformed world order based on partnerships, under the support of reformed/transformed institutions that can implement an international configuration based on partnerships.



In this context, NATO's policy concerning its partnerships may be understood as an instrument that fosters resilience of the liberal shared values, norms, procedures belonging to the liberal world order to share them in a broad area of nations before the United States influence has diminished to the extent that it can no longer diffuse its practices. To sum up, the continuation of the Liberal World Order will be highly influenced by the existence of a network of partnerships with different types of partners, in which the NATO-EU partnership has a crucial role (Waever, 2014).

Therefore, the study case proved that gradually, the indicators of resilience reflect in the documents and that the NATO EU partnership is an instrument that can foster resilience both for NATO and for the EU.

3. Conclusions and results of the research: fostering resilience for a cooperative security space

The research tried to find out if the cooperative security concept explains what security is and how it can be managed. The secondary research question tried to establish if partnerships foster resilience. The analysis proved that we are in a phase of increased uncertainties when the role of international institutions is contested. Even the capacity of existing theories to explain the realities we are facing is contested and I proved that the cooperative security concept passes the test of both academic standards and policy implementation. International institutions confront with new types of actors, new types of conflicts and their capacity to adapt is crucial. The case study proved that NATO and EU managed to transform their practices, customizing them to the evolving challenges. Furthermore, the NATO EU partnership is a vital instrument in fostering resilience.

The so called mantra of the past – Out of area or out of business, signifying the need to involve in operations outside the borders – may be reformulated in present times as – In area or in trouble, signifying the need to deal also with internal challenges. In other words, internal and external issues must be addressed and resilience has to be made a new core task of NATO.

Resilience is more than military action, it is also about the civil support for the military action and is also about the cooperation and transparency of host nations, if we refer to the recent forward defence measures. Civil preparedness is a critical enabler for collective defence of the alliance as the population is an asset.

The public cannot be treated as a liability that must be taken care of. Planning for the worst is essential, especially having into mind the fact that the nuclear threat is improbable but not impossible, and even if one hopes for the best, it has to plan for the worse.

Baseline resilience requirements are needed, especially as building resilience involves many stakeholders and representatives for key sectors have to be identified and engaged in exercises based on common interest and continuous planning. The private sector needs to be involved because they have as much



interest in the resilience of the nation in order to provide services as the government.

Both NATO and EU need resilient partners. The old core concept was forward defence; maybe forward resilience is a new way to deal with this grey area and to help weaker societies, many of whom are our partners, to become more resilient societies. It is in our interest to do that, we have a lot of tools to offer to those nations, for example the Partnership for Peace, or developing new instruments – adding resilience to the NATO Ukraine or NATO Georgia agenda. The NATO EU partnership has to be proactive when talking about resilience.

Regarding the foreign policy of the USA concerning NATO, especially after the recent presidential elections, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that NATO is an alliance of 29 democracies, and the fact that they are lead by politicians does not change the commitment of the state towards the alliance. A strong NATO is good for Europe, but also for the USA. As well as a strong Europe is in the benefit of the Trans Atlantic community. Especially after two World Wars we all learned that stability in Europe is also important for North America.

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