RETHINKING CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE'S IDENTITY: CULTURAL PLURALISM AND MULTICULTURALISM VERSUS THE RISE OF NATIONALISM

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Abstract

Without a doubt, in the last several years, the solidarity and unity in the EU has been challenged by the rise of populism mixed with far-right nationalism. States in Central and Eastern Europe and post USSR states like Ukraine should continue to elaborate their own vision on ethnic minorities, refugees, and immigration issues. In the following paper, the methodology of political science and international relations is used in order to examine the case of Canadian multiculturalism and try to compare and apply it to Central and Eastern European realities. In the CEE region, the states try to influence neighbours' internal policies in different aspects (and ethnic policy is not an exclusion). The research question of this paper is: Do cultural pluralism or multiculturalism have suggestions for this? The research results show that due to complex historical issues, the post-Soviet legacy and securitization concerns, multiculturalism is a highly unfavourable policy for the region in the near future.

Keywords: cultural pluralism, multiculturalism, Kymlicka, Central and Eastern Europe

Introduction

The term "multiculturalism" emerged in political discourse in the 1960s in Canada and Australia. These states can probably claim the biggest success in the practical realization of multiculturalism as a policy. It is worthwhile examining their experience regarding these states as role models for the abovementioned phenomena (and policies). From the very start, multiculturalism was focused initially on schooling and the children of Asian/Black/Hispanic immigrants, and it meant the extension of the school, both in terms of curriculum and as an institution, to include features such as ''mother tongue'' teaching, non-Christian religions and holidays, halal food, Asian dress, and so on (Modood, 2007, pp. 3105-3106). In Canada as well as Australia, however, the focus was significantly much wider from the beginning and also incorporated, for instance, constitutional and land issues, and it has been about the association with the nation. This is partly because these

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nations experienced a continuing and recent historical past associated with ethnic communities created by migration, usually coming from various areas in Europe, since there were unresolved lawful inquiries regarding the entitlement and status of Indigenous people in Canada and Australia, and, in the case of Canada, there was the additional problem of the rise of the nationalists along with secessionist movement within French-speaking Quebec (Modood, 2007, p. 3106). The issue associated with multiculturalism within Europe and North America should be understood within a broader world context concerning the changes that have happened since 1945, and since 1989 within relationships between so-called first, second and also third worlds. Right after 1945, the process of unequal economic development resulted in large-scale migration within and also to the countries in the first world, which include Western Europe, the United States, and the economically advanced settler-dominated territories of the former European empires like Canada and Australia (Rex, 1995, p. 243).

As Modood states, multiculturalism is developed as the political accommodation through the state and/or the dominant category of all minority cultures identified first of all through reference to race or ethnicity (also nationality, Aboriginality, or even religious beliefs could possibly be an issue). Ethnicity is more questionable, not only since it stretches the range of the groups which have to be accommodated, but additionally because it helps make larger political claims and thus has a tendency to resist having these claims reduced to those of immigrants (Modood, 2007, p. 3106).

Multiculturalism means different things in different states (which is not surprising). While in the U.S. and Canada, ethnicity, race and language usage are seen as the major political challenge, it is probably Muslim populations and migration that have become the focus of discourse about minorities in Europe (Koopmans, 2013, 2015; Modood, 2007, p. 3108). Migration is also accompanied by the 'multiculturalism has failed' rhetoric in Europe (Koopmans, 2013, p. 148; Kymlicka, 2010, p. 12). In Central and Eastern Europe, multiculturalism is not considered a theoretical background for ethnic policy, though EU standards in minority policy were established. The waves of migrants from 2015-2016 and the rise of populist and far-right political elites in CEE stipulate the tentative conclusion that there is no chance for multiculturalism in the region in the near future. However, there are deeper and more structural features of the CEE region which let us make the abovementioned conclusion.

1. Multiculturalism as a Policy

The definition, issues, and history of multiculturalism have been studied carefully by different scholars around the globe (Banks, 2004; Benet-Martínez and Hong, 2014; Coello and Prins, 2010; Fleras, 2009; Hardy, 2017; Hedetoft, 2013; Inglis, 1996; Lentin and Titley, 2011; Moran, 2017; Reitz *et al*., 2009; Taylor *et al*., 1994). We must agree with Leung that "multiculturalism, like any other concept and ideology, is not static, and constantly evolves in context" (Leung, 2011, p. 30). Multiculturalism is defined in two dimensions: the state of a society

or the world in which there exist numerous distinct ethnic and cultural groups seen to be politically relevant; and a program or policy advocating or promoting such a society (Smelser and Baltes, 2001, p. 10169). The idea of multiculturalism is based on the Kantian principle of individual freedom to live by the rules and judgments of a person's own conscience (Coello and Prins, 2010, p. 21).

Modern multiculturalism is often said to have its roots in a speech by Canadian Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier in 1905, where he said, "We do not anticipate, and we do not want, that any individuals should forget the land of their origin or their ancestors. Let them look to the past, but let them also look to the future; let them look to the land of their ancestors, but let them look also to the land of their children" (Sarraf, 2015, p. 35). In 1971, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau developed Canada's multiculturalism policy within the bilingual platform. This particularly meant that Canada appeared to be the very first nation worldwide to have an official multiculturalism policy and therefore was the first in terms of creating corporate pluralism where state policy protected the actual cultural differences among groups as well as provided institutional means to motivate ethnically proportionate distribution of power and privilege (Guo and Wong, 2015, p. 2).

While a lot of studies on multiculturalism had been done (and a lot of definitions of multiculturalism have been made) it is worthwhile to focus mainly on Will Kymlicka's works as he is not only one of the most prominent and devoted supporters of multiculturalism now (though he has a lot of critics too) and a recognized political philosopher, but he has also published the results of his research on multiculturalism in CEE. The very essence of Kymlicka's liberal multiculturalism is formulated in one of his last papers:

> The state is responsible for ensuring fair background conditions, including institutional conditions relating to the public recognition of language and culture, but individuals are free to make choices from that background, and are responsible for considering the prospective costs and benefits of their choices. Liberal multiculturalism is, therefore, focused on the provision of fair opportunities to freely pursue culture-related interests rather than the imposition of duties to maintain any particular identity or way of life (Kymlicka, 2017, p. 1).

Kymlicka also asks important questions (and for the region of CEE they are of extreme importance): How did a minority come to be a minority? How did a particular state come to have a right to rule over this particular minority and over this particular territory? Realising the fact that a particular state rules a particular minority is not God-given, but emerges out of a particular political process (that could last for decades and even more), and a normative theory of minority rights should be, at least in part, a theory about when these processes are legitimate (and if they are illegitimate, how this can be rectified). By asking these questions, we are likely to evaluate minority rights claims differently than if we start by presupposing legitimate sovereignty (Kymlicka, 2017, p. 4). CEE is a region of former empires and the space of post-Soviet states, where ethnicities were forced to

change their status (like the Crimean Tatars or Germans in the USSR after World War II, when they were declared enemies of the state), place of living (deportation of Ukrainians in Poland), etc. So Kymlicka's question is the right point to start with when performing research on the region of CEE.

It is Mann's vision that the vast majority of scholarship on multicultural policies has tended to be sociological in theory and approach (Mann, 2012, p. 483). But modern international relations also influence an internal state's policies such as ethnic policy (whether is it in the form of multiculturalism or not). The Russian Federation uses the factor of "endangered Russian speakers" (Kozachuk, 2016) to justify its foreign policy (as Moscow pointed out, Russia defended Russians in Crimea and found no other solution than to annex the peninsula, Yost, 2015, p. 538). The same situation is happening in the Balkans with Serbia – Kosovo relations. The ethnic factor still plays an important role in forming bilateral relations. After the introduction of Education Law in Ukraine in 2017, Hungary became furious about "protecting Hungarians in Ukraine". So the ethnic factor in international relations in CEE should not be underestimated.

In political and social sciences, states like Canada and Australia are probably associated with multiculturalism as their "trademark". For example, Canada established the multiculturalism policy in the 1970s. It seems that Canadian multiculturalism has had success and the question arises: Could Canada's multiculturalism lessons be learned by other countries? Could their policies be used in Central and Eastern European countries?

The very first answer would be "no", as nation and identity building processes are unique for every state. And these processes vary in their practices in Europe and North America. But if taking into consideration that the word shifts to uncertainty in international relations (here the mixture of nationalism, populism, protectionism, #alternativefacts, etc.), Central and Eastern European states, and post-Soviet states like Ukraine, should pay more attention to their concepts of ethnic policy. Ukraine, for example, has no ethnic policy at the moment. Living in such a turbulent time, learning from multicultural practices is of great importance.

The widespread image of Canada as a motherland of multiculturalism is a stereotype. It is much harder to distinguish the precise features of *Canadian* multiculturalism, to analyse what differentiates it from, let us say, Australian multiculturalism. It is even harder to suggest what features of Canadian multicultural inclusivity could be 'exported', and which moments should be adopted with great vigilance.

It is obvious there is no ultimate solution to solve ethnic and national disputes or to accommodate all people's needs in every state. There is no ultimate prescription we can take from one state and copy/paste it to another. Even if the state's policy is successful, there is no guarantee it would be successful anywhere else. First of all, as Mann suggests, bilingualism and biculturalism were the main precursors to the rise of multiculturalism in Canada (Mann, 2012, p. 497). Canada (and Australia too) is rather likely an *exception* to the rule because of its comparatively successful multiculturalism policy. Apart from the province of Quebec, there are hundreds of Indigenous peoples in Canada, alongside immigrant

or ethnic groups with ancestries or origins from a great variety of countries, speaking dozens of languages, and having diverse cultural values and practices. With such a diversity and pluralism in cities throughout Canada, it is then not by chance that in Canada a systematic and fruitful discourse on diversity and multiculturalism has taken place (Melich, 2010, p. 170). Also, it is necessary to remember that even though Canada has always been, since its origins, a polytechnic country, it has not always been the ideal model of immigrant integration or co-existing cultures (Hoyos, 2014, p. 39). Canada knows the tragic experience of the assimilation of Indigenous peoples, and some immigrant groups were restricted from entering the country, like immigrants from China during the early 20th century.

Beginning in the mid-1960s when the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism was formed, the philosophy of multiculturalism in Canada was firmly entrenched (though at first more in the form of biculturalism – according to the commission, the French language and culture was to be valued and legally supported, as was adopted in the Official Languages Act, 1969, as well as the diverse cultural heritage of Canadians) (Melich, 2010, pp. 173–174). Canada proclaimed its own multiculturalism policy in 1971, becoming the first country in the world to officially implement a legislative framework for multiculturalism. In 1982, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms included multiculturalism as an important part of the Canadian identity (Hoyos, 2014, p. 34). In 1988, Canada implemented the Canadian Multiculturalism Act, which commits the Government of Canada to facilitate the full participation of all Canadians regardless of race or ethnicity in all aspects of Canadian society (the Act established the full and equitable participation of individuals and communities of all origins in the continuing evolution and shaping of all aspects of Canadian society and provides assistance to eliminate any barriers to such participation; also it introduced the assurance of equal treatment and equal protection under the law, while respecting and valuing individuals' diversity and states an equal opportunity to obtain employment and advancement in all federal institutions for Canadians of all origins). And the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (2002) emphasized the importance of what has become known as the 'two-way street' approach to integrating immigrants and refugees in Canada (while Canada accepts and promotes a diverse population, newcomers are expected to adapt to Canada and to Canadian norms) (Blake, 2013, p. 99).

So what are the preconditions of Canadian multiculturalism and do they differ significantly from the CEE realities? They are partly unique in their nature, but their existence has formed Canadian multiculturalism as we know it now. One of the key points of multiculturalism is the *official policy* of the recognition of diversity. The diverse origins of immigrants have been recognized and some of their specific needs addressed throughout Canada's history (and some ethnic groups suffered restrictions), but the domination by British-originated elites characterized much of the political, economic, and social system of Canada, at least through the 1950s, with dramatic changes only in the last few decades. Starting in the 1970s things changed dramatically. One of the reasons for these changes was the Quiet Revolution in

Quebec as the growing urbanization and industrialization, accompanied by the decline of religion and increased educational levels, changed Quebec into a more modern and liberal society on the one hand, and caused more assertive nationalism on the other. The very rapid changes in the province's culture and society required adequate response to accommodate this independent society which increasingly called for self-determination and ethnic mobilization (Melich, 2010, p. 172). Also, Melich pointed out that Canada has become characterized by ethnic pluralism with a lower degree of accommodation to the prevailing *dominant* national culture, and with greater ethnic diversity and greater retention of *original* cultures than many other receiving countries, such as the United States. And increased urbanization and higher levels of education caused a change in culture to occur in the direction of increased tolerance to other cultures (Melich, 2010, p. 173).

2. Issues with Multiculturalism

Multiculturalism has its own issues and can hardly be selected as the ethnic policy (minorities' policy) model in CEE. Ruling political elites in CEE seem to have little enthusiasm for accommodating such liberal practices and trying to elaborate upon such a political discourse that multiculturalism has no ground in CEE. And they might be right till the definite point: One thing is to "gamble" with voters during elections campaigns and use minorities/migrants issue to achieve the goal (which is to gain/remain in power), and the other thing is that multiculturalism has its own issues.

As it was pointed out above, Kymlicka's vision of multiculturalism is well developed, substantial and logical, although has its critics. In his report, The Current State of Multiculturalism in Canada and Research Themes on Canadian Multiculturalism, 2008-2010, that was commissioned by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration to determine which multiculturalism issues are important nationwide and require the development of further research, Kymlicka identifies challenges for multiculturalism. Despite being published 7 years ago it is still relevant:

> Reviewing the debates on multiculturalism in Canada in the past few years, one is reminded of the words of Charles Dickens: „It was the best of times, it was the worst of times". On the one hand, we have witnessed not only growing evidence of Canada's comparative advantage in the integration of immigrants, but also growing evidence that the multiculturalism policy has played an important role in this comparative success. For defenders of multiculturalism, the evidence of the policy's benefits has never been stronger. On the other hand, we are witnessing a worldwide retreat from multiculturalism, most observable in Western Europe, and many commentators argue that this is a harbinger of Canada's future as well. For critics, multiculturalism is an inherently flawed idea, and while these flaws may have emerged more quickly or starkly in Western Europe, they are starting to reveal themselves here in Canada as well (Kymlicka, 2010, p. 5).

It is worthwhile to mention some scholars admit that multiculturalism has been declared to have failed not only in continental Europe but also in traditionally migrant-receiving societies such as Canada and Australia (Amarasingam *et al.*, 2016; Gozdecka *et al.*, 2014; Vertovec, 2010). Nevertheless, it is not the point of this paper to discuss whether it has failed or not in Canada or Western Europe. We will rather concentrate on the issues (problems) linked with multiculturalism as a policy (though these issues could be present in different states). One of the greatest stereotypes of multiculturalism (which nobody would like to 'import') is the segregation of ethnic, national and Indigenous groups, political radicalism, and the perpetuation of illiberal practices among immigrant groups (Kymlicka, 2010, p. 12). Actually ethnic and religious animosity can be seen in Western Europe more vividly, so this is really not the outcome CEE countries would welcome. Kymlicka points out the following signs of the "failure" of multiculturalism in Canada, which are widely used by its critics (who try to prove there is nothing of value to export in multiculturalism), as well as Kymlicka's responses to these critics (in brackets): ghettoization or the existence of ethnic enclaves (which is untrue, because the very sense of a ghetto is missed here), Islamic radicalism (which really is a concern, but it is not right to blame multiculturalism for that), the persistence of intolerant practices among some immigrant and minority groups as evidence that they are failing to integrate into liberal-democratic norms (though there is no evidence that this problem is worse in Canada or in multiculturalist countries, so again – it has nothing to do with multiculturalism as a policy), second-generation visible minorities express lower levels of belonging to Canada (which is of great concern, but if we take, for example, a feeling of pride for Canada, we find that visible minorities including second generation express very high levels of pride in Canada on a par with white Canadians), and a growing concerns and polarization in Quebec (multiculturalism has always been less popular in Quebec than in other provinces, but recent reports show that there is no need for a dramatic revision of the existing policy of accommodation) (Kymlicka, 2010, pp. 14-17). So Kymlicka suggests that these attempts to find signs of European-style problems in Canada are all misleading.

Instead, Kymlicka points out real unresolved issues in multiculturalism policy, which should be taken into account by policymakers (and in CEE states too). One of the greatest concerns is that the role of religious diversity within multiculturalism has not yet been adequately debated or explored (while the existing constitutional and legislative framework of freedom of belief in North America or the EU is largely appropriate, more work needs to be done in implementing the policy and managing the debates it raises).

Living in the age of post-truth and "fake news", the role of mass media covering minority issues is also of great concern. As there should not be obvious hate speech (or on the contrary, a blindness to covering sensitive topics) in CEE media, the media outlets that are more dependent on their owners' views could be a problem. Anyway, it is undeniable that the media play a vital role in shaping public attitudes, and so the link between multiculturalism and the media should be reconsidered (Kymlicka, 2010, pp. 18-19).

Also, Kymlicka makes the valuable argument "recent multiculturalism policies for ethnic groups formed by immigration overlie earlier linguistic and territorial accommodations of French Canadians, which overlie earlier historic agreements and settlements with Aboriginal peoples" (Kymlicka, 2007, p. 39). Of course, these three policy vectors should be distinguished as no single set of diversity policies can fulfill the current needs of Canada's diverse groups. But it is equally important to clarify how these three dimensions interact and "it would be regrettable, indeed tragic, if the three policy frameworks were seen as operating at cross purposes… we need to explain how these policies aim to build relations of inclusive citizenship that encompass all Canadians, and that we all have a stake in ensuring the success of these three sets of diversity policies" (Kymlicka, 2010, p. 19).

Finally, racism, discrimination and the declining economic performance of recent immigrants are supposed to be issues addressed by multiculturalism. While someone may stereotype Canada to be a state where a comparatively low level of hate crimes and racism occur, they are still present (Government of Canada, 2017). On the one hand, we can hardly find a country in the world that is completely free from racism, but nevertheless, the literature suggest findings on the topic: racism is one of the realities of multicultural societies and it does not disappear with the introduction of such a policy (Dua *et al.*, 2005; Enomoto and Fuji Johnson, 2016; Fleras, 2014).

On the other hand, since the 1970s, the average employment earnings of immigrants have declined steadily compared to those of Canadian-born workers. Despite the point earned entrance system, the reasons for this decline are not entirely clear, but there appears to be a number of contributing factors: discrimination, insufficient language skills, lack of recognition of foreign credentials and work experience in source countries, and growing labour market competition from highly educated Canadians (White *et al.*, 2015, p. 293).

Generally speaking, Gozdecka, Erkan and Kmak point out several trends that are observable in nearly all immigrant-receiving countries (albeit to different degrees): an excessive focus on gender inequality within traditional minority cultures; the shift from ethnicity and culture towards religion (in particular Islam); the increasing emphasis on social cohesion and security; the emergence of new forms of racism; and the relativization of international and transnational human rights law (researchers associate these potentially empowering discourses with post-multiculturalism) (Gozdecka *et al.*, 2014, pp. 52-53). All these issues are highly relevant to the CEE region as well.

3. Multiculturalism in Central and Eastern Europe?

The migration crisis of 2015-2016 hit a huge blow to European unity and solidarity. "Who is going to accommodate all these people? Why should we take the migrants quotas?" It's likely that these questions and more arose in Europeans' minds. In Central and Eastern European states, for example, there is no enthusiasm for accommodating migrants from the Middle East (as well as Africa and Asia).

Political actors in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic had built their rhetoric and constructed public discourse using "the failure of multiculturalism in Western Europe" argument. It seems CEE states go through an important stage in their ethno cultural identity and identify their commitment to EU values and principles or build their own vision of nationalism. Of course, every state has its own right to build their own ethnic policy, but living under the umbrella of EU regulations and directives makes it harder to continue to follow their own path. The examples of Poland and Hungary, who seem to face deep legal discussion with EU ruling bodies over internal politics, prove the lack of consensus in the region.

Numerous studies on the failure of multiculturalism in Western Europe are omitted in this paper. However, in 2010 Angela Merkel explained "Multikulti" as a trusting effort "to live happily side by side, and be happy to be living with each other" and this method, she carried on, "has failed, and failed utterly"; questioned in a TV interview on exactly what he thought of Merkel's evaluation of multiculturalism, French President Nicolas Sarkozy responded, "Yes, clearly, it is a failure" (Koopmans, 2013, p. 148). In a 2011 speech, British Prime Minister David Cameron, in the same manner, stated, "Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream" (Koopmans, 2013, p. 148).

Also, Koopmans suggests that the size of immigrant populations as well as their composition in terms of countries of origin, religion, and human capital is a key to understanding why multiculturalism has fallen further from grace in Europe than in the classical immigrant-receiving countries of the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Agreeing with Kymlicka, he states that religious rights are identified as the main source of controversy regarding multicultural rights, and the fact that Muslims make up a larger proportion of immigrants to Europe explains in part the more critical evaluation that multicultural policies receive there (Koopmans, 2013, p. 147).

The main research question remains, what could (or could not) CEE import from the Canadian, Australian, and Western European experience and what lessons might be learned? Of course, countries in this part of Europe differ significantly from Western countries (and from each other) in terms of history, demography, geopolitical stability, economic development and democratic consolidation. As Kymlicka points out, Western approaches may simply not be *relevant or helpful*, and any attempts to impose them against the wishes or traditions of the local population can be counterproductive in terms of ethnic relations (Kymlicka, 2015, p. 5).

After the collapse of the USSR and socialist regimes in CEE, too much attention was put on preventing ethnic conflicts there (this attention was probably appropriate, but the decision to make minority rights one of the criteria for 'rejoining Europe' had relatively little public debate or scholarly analysis) (Kymlicka, 2000; Kymlicka and Opalski, 2002). Territorial autonomy as a potential solution to territorial claims and disputes generally were not considered in the region of Central and Eastern Europe. Kymlicka discusses this issue in his book (Kymlicka and Opalski, 2002). Romania, Estonia, Lithuania – all of these countries opposed territorial autonomy as a potential threat to their sovereignty. Ukraine had

granted Crimea autonomic status hoping to prevent ethnic instability. However, as Russia's aggression and annexation of Crimea in 2014 have proven, it was not enough – Moscow used the 'endangered Russian speakers' rhetoric.

Unfortunately, living in the age of hybrid wars we cannot perceive the state's ethnic policy as its only internal sphere of interest. The enemy state could use weak points in this policy to pursue its own interests. Without a doubt, an independent state should not consult its neighbours on the steps it wants to take within its own internal arena. But sensitive issues such as ethnic and national minorities' policies should be under a microscope every day, and being closely monitored at this time. The answer to this devotion to the unitary state is hidden in history and international relations.

First of all, the majority of the states in Central and Eastern Europe gained (restored) their independence and sovereignty recently. Sovereignty, consolidation and unity are still strong enough and perform in the CEE state as an aftermath of the establishment of the independent state. For some states such as Ukraine, their very independence and territorial integrity are now under question due to Russia's aggression.

Another factor is that states will not accord greater powers or resources to groups (or territories) that are perceived as disloyal, and therefore a threat to the security of the state. In particular, states will not accommodate groups which are seen as likely to collaborate with foreign enemies. As the Russian Federation continues to threaten international relations and laws it is no surprise that there are so few states that want to establish territorial autonomies and feed 'the fifth column' inside. Minority groups are often seen as a part of the fifth column, likely to be working for a neighboring enemy, and this is particularly a concern where minorities are related to a neighboring state by ethnicity or religion so that the neighboring state claims the right to intervene to protect this minority (Kymlicka, 2015, p. 21). Threats have come to real violence and aggression in Georgia with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and in Ukraine with Crimea and Donbas. Kymlicka suggests that the relationships between states and minorities are seen as much less a matter of regular democratic national politics to be bargained with, but more as a matter of state security in which the condition has to restrict the normal democratic process to be able to protect the state (Kymlicka, 2015, p. 21). Under the circumstances of securitization, minority self-organization may be lawfully limited (e.g. group political events banned), fraction leaders might be subject to police monitoring, and the increase of specific needs may be unlawful (like laws about promoting secession). Even though minority requirements can be articulated, they will be flatly rejected through the larger community and the state as an institution. Therefore "securitization of ethnic relations erodes both the democratic space to voice minority demands, and the likelihood that those demands will be accepted" (Kymlicka, 2015, p. 21).

So in Eastern Europe, Kymlicka suggests, the history of imperialism, collaboration and border changes have encouraged three interrelated assumptions which are now widely accepted by the states in the region: (a) that minorities are disloyal, not just in the sense that they lack loyalty to the state (that is equally true of secessionists in Quebec or Scotland), but in the stronger sense that they

collaborated with former oppressors, and continue to collaborate with current enemies or potential enemies; therefore, (b) a strong and stable state requires weak and disempowered minorities; and therefore (c) the treatment of minorities is above all a question of national security (Kymlicka, 2015, p. 22).

The author of the following paper had taken the case of Ukraine in previous findings. When it comes to Ukraine, there exists a big difference between ethnic Russians and Russian speakers. This difference prevails as a result of heritage belonging to the Soviet Union (Sovietisation, Russification, etc.). Russia's policy of "protection with regard to Russian speakers within the globe" is actually easy to understand from the position of Russian residents, yet is definitely inappropriate when it comes to Ukraine. There was clearly no actual danger to Russian speakers in Ukraine from the times of the Revolution of Dignity so far. To keep Ukraine from being impacted, the Kremlin used the tag "endangered Russian speakers" (Kozachuk, 2016, p. 377). Contemporary Russian policy toward Ukraine has to be assessed as certainly unfriendly. Its self-proclaimed "support" of the Russian speakers in Ukraine is indeed a menace to the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Employing state-managed media to generate fake stories has not been acceptable to disintegrate Ukrainian society and set the state's territorial integrity and independence within the issue. In fact, Russian speakers within non-occupied regions of Ukraine feel free to communicate in any language they really want, however, Russian speakers from the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts are afflicted by this "care" through the Russian Federation (Kozachuk, 2016, p. 378).

Moreover, the Canadian multiculturalism policy is hardly applicable to Europe, as "Canada has been for generations an immigration country by definition and the concept of the nation-state has evolved there in a different way, with fewer impediments on setting criteria for citizenship rights on the level making them both reasonably attainable by newcomers and facilitating acceptance of minority immigrants by the rest of society" (Melich, 2010, p. 187). The geographic factor (Canada is quite far away from the present states' donors of migrants and refugees) and the different demographic and sociological profiles of migrants and refugees in Canada and Europe should be taken into consideration when comparing the states' policies.

Melich also suggests that immigrants to Europe were rarely seen as potential citizens, but rather as guest workers who would eventually return home upon completion of their work contracts, while in Canada access to citizenship has been part of the immigration and multicultural package (Melich, 2010, p. 180). Central and Eastern Europe do not seem to be a travel destination for migrants, and the society there (as well as in Central Europe) has little intention of welcoming them. So here we also have nothing to discuss and propose to import from Canada.

The success of multiculturalism in Canada has its roots in the very sense of Canada's state. Multiculturalism has laid the foundation for more than forty years, and its principles and values are parallel and complementary to a liberal and democratic society. Multiculturalism strengthens the Canadian political, economic and social system (Leung, 2011, p. 30). In addition, the Canadian state itself strengthens multiculturalism.

Vermeersch doubts "whether Western political theory concerning minority rights protection constitutes a legitimate basis for political practice in CEE" and "it is important to analyse minority questions increasingly from the perspective of International Relations, taking into account the effects of transnational pressures, evolving international/regional regimes and the changing nature of the state" (Vermeersch, 2015, p. 137). That is the same point suggested above: Since 2014 it has been obvious that actors in the region play the minority card to pursue their own goals, like the Russian Federation did in Ukraine openly (and how they continue to use Russian speakers or ethnic Russians cards in Latvia).

The rise of populism is the other side of the problem. This decade, it seems as though all Western civilization (and we mean here North America, EU states, and affiliated states like Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia) are suffering from it significantly, and it seems to be our agenda for the near future (Mudde, 2016; Wodak, 2015). Internal political actors use minorities and migration rhetoric to achieve/keep their places in parliaments, and the migration crisis of 2015-2016 is evidence of how internal speculations and discussions may divide even EU members, to say nothing about Eastern Partnership policy. Poland continues to use anti-immigrant discourse, stating it received millions of Ukrainians and should be excluded from EU migrants' redistribution quotas. Another factor is that Ukrainians are not refugees but economic migrants, a cheap and highly desirable labour force for Polish businesses. So here Poland simultaneously fights against the attacks of the European Commission and keeps its high GDP growth steady despite the huge amount of Poles who have left Poland for the United Kingdom, Ireland, or Norway. We do not tend to analyse or judge such a policy here (it is also possible to point out the Hungarian and Romanian policy of distributing their passports throughout Ukraine's neighbouring regions), but rather we would like to conclude that the ethnic factor became highly relevant in CEE interstate relations last decade. We suggest that instead of using minorities/migration discourse to achieve their internal (and often populist) goals, a comprehensive update of minorities/migration policy principles revision in the CEE region is needed. The Eastern Partnership might be seen as an institutional mechanism in the region to ease tensions, at least during the irresponsible and unpredictable behaviour of Putin's Russia. We should keep in mind that the Eastern Partnership program provides an opportunity to boost the performance of the process, not merely through responding to the requirements of the European Union to determine institutionalized relationships with the post-Soviet states with no membership perspective, but additionally to promote some sort of shared perspective of hybrid warfare along with a reaction to other common issues. Security, without even the cooperation of military services, ought to be among the completely new focal points where the European Union has no guidebook for resolution. Simply by working with very important lessons from the Ukrainian crisis, the European Union can produce an extensive platform with regard to addressing hybrid threats in the region alongside the states from the Eastern Partnership (Shelest, 2015, p. 53).

Some scholars make a reasonable critique of multiculturalism policy (Anwarullah Bhuiyan, 2011). It is clear that neither Kymlicka's nor other concepts

of multiculturalism are possible in Central and Eastern Europe at least for now. If we take the international relations methodology and, for example, Walt's "balance of threat" theory, we could consider Russia as a continuously interfering actor, trying to influence Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, and the Baltic countries and see these states as a threat (according to the theory, a state's behaviour is determined by the threat perceived by other states or alliances; states will not balance against other states which are increasing in power, as balance of power theory predicts), but rather against those that are perceived as a threat (Bock *et al*., 2015).

The other dimension of the problem is what nationalism and religious studies suggest. According to a Pew Research Centre survey conducted in June 2015 – July 2016 in eighteen countries, Orthodox Christians, as well as Catholics through the entire region, tended to be ready to recognize each other as neighbours and as fellow citizens with their states (Pew Research Center, 2017, p. 158). Nevertheless, the study shows limitations to this mutual good will. The particular survey additionally discovered the belief towards several smaller sized religious as well as ethnic groups in the region – Romas, Muslims and Jews. Generally speaking, respondents were much less ready to recognize individuals from these three groupings as family members, neighbours or even fellow citizens than they were to accept Catholics or Orthodox Christians. Romas tended to be, overall, the least recognized of the groups (Pew Research Center, 2017, p. 159). Most respondents from the eighteen countries surveyed tended to be unwilling to simply accept Romas as family members, and about one half or even more of respondents in ten states said that they might not recognize Romas as neighbours (over the region, the median of 31% point out that they might become unwilling to accept Romas even as fellow citizens) (Pew Research Center, 2017, p. 159). Throughout Central and Eastern Europe, fewer individuals denied Muslims as family members compared to those who rejected Romas, despite the fact that the majority of both Catholics and Orthodox Christians (medians of 63% and 61%, respectively) claimed they might become unwilling to accept Muslims as family members (regionally, even more Catholics compared to Orthodox Christians pointed out they might not really recognize Muslims as neighbours or even as fellow citizens) (Pew Research Center, 2017, p. 161). Jews tended to be more recognized in the region compared to Muslims as well as Romas. Nevertheless, approximately one half or even more of the adults surveyed in four states pointed out they might become unwilling to accept Jews as family members (Pew Research Center, 2017, p. 162).

Moreover, the recent Freedom House report's key findings state that "Poland recorded the largest category declines and the second-largest Democracy Score decline in the history of the report" and "Hungary has registered the largest cumulative decline in Nations in Transit history, after its score has fallen for 10 consecutive years" (Freedom House, 2018).

Despite all of the EU standards (among EU members and others), it is obvious that much more needs to be done and much more time must pass in order to erase such attitudes and teach future generations more tolerant and diverse discourse. And here the role of academia should not be undermined, though the visible effect may continue for decades. The Pew Research Centre survey

underlines that with their conclusion: "people with more education are more likely than others to say they would be willing to accept Roma, Muslims or Jews as relatives, neighbours or fellow citizens" (Pew Research Center, 2017, p. 163).

Conclusions

Multiculturalism was successful in removing structural barriers and fostering common multicultural spaces for Canadians to come together. The success of multiculturalism is a result of successful integration, a two-way learning of immigrants and society, of refugees and the host state. We carefully discussed only the ethnic discourse of multiculturalism in this paper, as it is believed that the other possible aspects of diversity management (culture, language, gender, sexuality, etc.) *should be* studied carefully when considering their import from Canada. CEE countries and especially post-Soviet states still have to implement a lot of principles, rules and institutions in order to become consolidated liberal democracies (if they want to become one, of course). The experience of multiculturalism in Canada has a lot to offer here.

However, when we start to talk about ethnic minorities' policy, here the possibilities for import have zero chances. Regional actors like the Russian Federation, with their aggressive policies, leave no chance for Central and Eastern European states to adopt multiculturalism, as they consider minorities' issues as security issues. Due to this paradigm, multiculturalism has simply nothing to offer. Minorities' rights will be sacrificed for national security and territorial integrity issues. States like Ukraine, which suffers from Russian aggression, will think *first* of their sovereignty and territorial integrity and *then* about accommodating ethnic and national minorities' needs. The other actors in the region should understand and accept this. Education seems to be a key element to overcoming the existing tendencies in the region.

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