COUNTERING YOUTH RECRUITMENT
TO TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS:
THE EU AND RUSSIAN PRACTICES

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Abstract

Amid activation of Islamic State (IS) recruiters among European and Russian youth, society is more and more concerned about the efficiency of contemporary higher education humanistic function. The article identifies one of the relevant areas in studying European and Russian practices of preventing youth recruitment to military terrorist organizations. Main reasons for radicalization and conditions of potential successful youth recruitment to terrorist structures were identified. The role and place of state and society, values and beliefs as well as the content of educational programs, educational and information technology in countering terrorist ideology were specified. Based on the survey carried out among 881 Russian students, the approach towards state anti-terrorist policy and coverage of terrorism by the Russian mass media was studied. Measures on efficient prevention of terrorist recruitment campaign among young people were drafted.

Keywords: terrorism, radicalization, education, Islamic state.

Introduction

Today, terrorist recruitment among young people as well as home-coming of militants who fought for Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq are one of the most important security challenges not only in Russia but also in the majority of the European countries. This threat dictates the need for analyzing key trends in sending foreign fighters to conflict zones as well as international experience of

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countering terrorist recruitment among youth and jihadists coming back home. Foreign fighters actively return to their countries of residence while bringing home terror technologies developed initially by Al-Qaeda and then enhanced by IS.

Terrorist attacks took place in many countries over the period from 2015 to 2017. Terrorist attacks in the UK (London), Sweden (Stockholm) and Russia (Saint Petersburg, North Caucasus) are some of the examples of terrorist attacks committed by fighters "educated" in Syria and Iraq. They demonstrate that almost no country is immune to this threat. Apart from carrying out terrorist attacks, these jihadists coming back home can spread extremism and religious radicalism propaganda, recruit new IS fighters among youth also using different financial tools (United Nations, 2015). Finally, terrorist attacks as well as the spreading of radicalism, extremism and terrorism ideology are carried out not only by fighters but also by people who fell under the influence of terrorists coming back home or propaganda from abroad conducted through social networks.

The XXI century information society develops brand new potential threats to the functioning of both individual countries and their citizens and global society in general (Simionov, 2015). This includes, to a great extent, terrorism that is mostly developed in the information sphere. Terrorists successfully recruit new militants via the Internet. European and Russian students is one of the sectors that is influenced by recruiters. That is why modern world terrorism threats require updated approaches to youth outreach, for example, patriotic education should be also regarded as a dedicated process of countering youth recruitment to terrorist organizations.

Today, a lot of cases when European and Russian students were recruited as fighters to Islamic State terrorist organization have been brought to light by the mass media. Varvara Karaulova from Moscow State University, girls from Belgorod University, a student from Astrakhan medical academy, a student from Tver State University and many other representatives of the educated youth make attempts to reach Syria in order to carry out "holy deeds" or to help militants in their "battle between good and evil" without understanding possible implications. According to different estimations, more than four thousand Russians are already fighting for Islamic State militants (Tziarras, 2017). Also, according to the Europol as of June 26, 2015, around 5000 EU citizens fought for extremists (Mamoun, 2015).

In order to identify the approach of Russian students to anti-terrorist measures and assess the efficiency of anti-extremist information sharing, a survey was carried out among first to fourth year students at Plekhanov Russian University of Economics. In general, 881 students were surveyed. The age of the respondents varied from 17 to 24 years, the average age being 20 years. The gender factor if as follows: 35% male respondents and 65% female respondents.

1. What makes young people join terrorists?

A whole range of problems explains why young people join international terrorist structures. In general, they bear evidence of spiritual and social problems

in the communities where terrorists are recruited. *The first reason for recruitment* is a spiritual and secular cultural crisis in the postmodern age. A research carried out by the French Anti-Islamic Sects Center (CPDSI) revealed the key role of not social but rather cultural and psychological problems in the recruitment. It shows that radical Islamic organizations in France recruit young people mainly belonging to the middle class (67%) including those from atheistic families (80%) (Topping *et al.,* 2015). In the modern postindustrial world religious fundamentalists suggest very simple answers to spiritually and existentially important questions. Modern secular culture is focused on an individual and independent search of the reason for being and the selection of life journey which are the issues many young people are not ready to face due to their psychological immaturity. Fundamentalist ideology clearly defines the aim of life, creates the feeling of belonging to something bigger rather than an individual (Atran, 2010). Islamists share the idea of belonging to "a group that has a pronounced identity and opposes itself to the rest of the world" (Sénat, 2015). Young radicals acquire in the jihad the idea of "a fine value system that they couldn't find in their own country" (Moghaddam, 2006). The educated youth also falls into recruiters' traps – the process of learning something new involves them and brings about thirst for knowledge in the form of a test aspiration, sometimes unusual for others, to experience the thing that is prohibited to others. It follows, thus, that young people should be prevented from receiving education? Of course not. Knowledge prevents us to a great extent from misbehaving and that is why students are the avant-garde of youth but they tend more to look for answers to their questions and here they sometimes fall victims to professionals.

The second reason is pursuit of material wealth. Islamic State is one of the richest terrorist organizations that spares no expense to recruit young people. There are various schemes of "buying" future jihad fighters and they are attractive to young people: from simple promises of fast and large income to the allocation of loans, payment of debts, assistance to family and friends experiencing hardships (Oxnevad, 2016). Then these debts are collected through faithful actions. It is worth noticing that the humanity has been recruiting war mercenaries for centuries and that is why the experience of classical options is quite extensive. However, scientific and technological advances suggest new recruitment technologies, for example, online technology. In economically developed countries an important reason for recruitment is the low level of Islamic youth social integration, especially among immigrants. Still, a significant target audience for recruiters are troubled Islamic youth. These people are easily influenced by IS as they are inspired with Islamic brotherhood romanticism and the feeling of belonging to the great cause (Thompson, 2017). However, the farther from the Western world people are recruited, the more important is militants' desire to just make good money and comfortably settle down (Pollard *et al.* 2015). In this regard, going to jihad is just an extreme form of employment. A certain role in third world countries is attributed to social anti-corruption protests.

The third reason for recruitment is the efficiency of radicalism propaganda, especially in case of IS. Such propaganda is ready to reach out to almost any motives of young people (Gurr, 1970). IS has developed individual recruitment methods for various groups of potential recruits. Propaganda materials published by IS appeal to their desire of a careless life among friends provided with guaranteed food and in a good climate (Ingram, 2014). IS is represented in them as a utopia, an alternative to the habitual world where a young person could not develop (Ingram, 2016).

Online recruitment has its pronounced advantages for recruiters – distant concealment that impedes the work of legal enforcement authorities to a great extent and justifies a twenty-four-hour online work of Internet recruiters almost in a safe mode. At the same time the target audience of online recruiters looking for people to commit terrorist attacks are also wealthy young people who not only have free access to information but also have obligations, for example, in the course of certain educational classes they need to come up with a creative solution to social-political, economic and spiritual problems of the society. Sometimes their searches lead them to different forms of electronic contact with those who are ready not only to understand their desires and requests but also become the only listener and then fulfill them. Youth and students that have been carefully but persistently influenced by professionals for many months, can yield to the radicalization process and will be partially ready to accept the relevant ideology. And there is immediately a person who narrates aggressively that the fateful hour has come and you need to go "defend your ideals with deadly force" or carry out a "righteous struggle in your own home" (Sageman, 2004). Thus, a yesterday's boy or girl student secretly leaves not even informing their parents.

2. European experience in countering youth recruitment

Fighters' activity is still a relevant issue for European countries: whether to prosecute them, reinforce the functioning of intelligence services or integrate them in society (Lister, 2015). These two approaches can be conventionally called "rigid" and "soft" approaches. In general, an efficient model is the one which divides fighters into two groups: the first group includes those who are ready to abandon criminal activity, the other one – those who are not ready to adapt to civil life. A softer approach is applied to the first group while a rigid approach is used for the second one. The main problem is to develop methods for classifying fighters who are coming back. At the same time, the existing world experience in this sphere is still considered unsatisfactory.

The best well-known practice of former fighters' rehabilitation is the Aarhus model developed in Denmark in 2015 (The Local, 2015). Thus, a special rehabilitation center for fighters was created and a hotline was launched for citizens with relevant problems. The model's basic principle is maximum social integration of radicalization victims. Social services, police, teachers and reliable family

members control deradicalization process and at the same time act as social mentors (Mansel, 2015).

This time is at the same time criticized by a number of experts for an overly soft attitude towards terrorists who committed crimes (Carlqvist, 2015). A strategy which criminalizes actions of former fighters and puts them under control of special services is deemed to be more reliable. There are similar deradicalization programs in the majority of the EU countries (Haller, 2015). In general, no absolutely successful models of deradicalized persons' social integration as an alternative to repressive measures have been created. That is why the recruitment prevention measures are considered to be most efficient to fight terrorism.

Such methods are mainly developed in Europe. It is explained by the fact that among the developed countries EU members have faced this problem to the greatest extent. Among other things, the most well-known and efficient methods to prevent recruitment are as follows:

1. Information campaigns on the development of national identity. In the majority of the EU countries as well as in Russia the recruitment risk is mostly connected with the problem of immigrant integration. Thus, since 2011 Austria has seen the introduction of the program entitled "Together: Austria" that combines an online information campaign with the development of a school program (Die Presse, 2015a). An important mechanism of the Austrian immigrant integration program is the invitation of successful community representatives to give lectures at schools and universities. More than 300 representatives attend educational institutions and speak about their successful lives in Austria. The program audience covers over 20 thousand people (Zusammen Österreich, 2017[1]). Early in 2014, the program was supplemented with a pubic initiative entitled "I feel proud" (Stolzdrauf), that has become the most successful information campaign of the Austrian government in Facebook. The users were asked to prepare and upload a short video clip in which they explain what they are proud of in their country and why. Particular attention was paid to target audiences among immigrants (Gadenstätter, 2014). Within the first two weeks around 50 thousand users uploaded videos on Facebook and 2.5 thousand users uploaded them to Twitter. Public and political communities among national and religious minorities also took an active art in the campaign. The results of the above-mentioned events were highly appreciated for significant scale and scope of religious and national minorities' voluntary participation – communities that belong to the risk group because of terrorist threat (Der Standart, 2014). At the end of 2014, a research was carried out in order to assess the results of program implementation (a sampling of around one thousand people): 62% of Austrian program participants said that it had had a positive impact on them (Die Presse, 2015b).

2. Implementation of programs on countering extremism in the educational system. Considering the scale of IS recruitment in France, no wonder that this

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[1] See more http://www.zusammenoesterreich.at/index.php?id=5.

country was the one that started developing most actively measures to fight terrorist ideology in the sphere of education. Thus, a special program entitled "Big mobilization of education to support the Republican values" was adopted by the Ministry of Education and Science in February 2015 (Ministère de l'Education nationale, 2015a). The program envisages: the training of around 300 000 methodologists in anti-extremism measures; development of school and university mass media system; interaction with online portals and national mass media; introduction of the Day of Secular State on December, 9 (the day when the law on separation of church and state was adopted) in educational institutions; patriotic events; introduction of the Week dedicated to the fight against racism and Anti-Semitism as forms of radical and extremist behavior; development of research in the sphere of radicalization; distribution of guidelines with possible signs indicating the involvement of students in radical religious organizations (Ministère de l'Education nationale, 2015b). Such measures could serve as a benchmark for Russia especially for Islamic regions in the Volga region and North Caucasus.

Moreover, in July 2015, the national Senate Committee established after Paris attacks in January 2015 approved a series of measures on the reinforcement of educational institutions' activities in propaganda of secular and anti-extremist values. In particular, one of the proposals features the introduction of the Teacher's Oath when assuming the position which contains an obligation to communicate knowledge on the best periods in the French history to students in order to reinforce social unity. Nevertheless, such legal initiatives demonstrate that the problem is acute and that even the large-scale anti-extremist measures on the reformation of university and school education that were adopted seem insufficient for the French society.

Comprehensive anti-extremist seminars for civil servants especially for teachers, doctors and social workers on countering terrorism have become widespread in France (La Dépêche, 2015). The aim of such seminars is to develop skills that detect early signs of youth radicalization that arise at the stage of recruitment by religious extremists. Social isolation of young people, disconnection from the previous circle of contacts and renouncement of the habitual life style are among the early signs. The practice of holding such seminars is highly appreciated by experts (La Dépêche, 2015). In case of Varvara Karaulova, a Russian Moscow State University student recruited by IS, almost no one paid attention to the obvious signs of her radicalization. However, if they were detected, certain preventive measures could help this girl escape from terrorist networks.

In the Federal Republic of Germany political education agencies under ministries on family affairs and youth policy on the level of federated state annually hold seminars for students and young people on extremism issues (Staatskanzlei des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2017). It is worth noticing that these measures were initially aimed at the fight with right wing neo-Nazi extremism. However, it has been recently refocused to fight religious extremism instead.

In the UK the fight with religious extremism in the educational system continued at universities as well. In July 2015, a comprehensive PREVENT program that was followed by a number of measures was launched. In particular, all the teaching staff is completing a thorough instruction on the problems connected with religious extremism promulgation. Special attention is paid to Muslim students although the official program materials do not disclose this fact in order to avoid accusations of racism and phobia of immigrants.

3. Development of special programs of interaction among the university, school and police. For instance, in the middle of 1997 in Norway the police and parents of children involved in radical groups initiated the "Exit" program (Smith and Julie, 2015). Among other things, it features the following objectives: support of young people who would like to leave radical groups that resort to violence; support of parents who have their children involved in such groups; development and dissemination of information and methodology for social workers and teachers. The program was initially mainly aimed at the fight with right wing racist extremism. Then the program principles were also applied to the everyday operations of the police and services in charge of youth radicalization problems and terrorist recruitment.

Key element of the Norwegian deradicalization strategy are consultations with psychologists at the police station ("Private conversation") with a view to preserve youth within publicly acceptable framework as an alternative to prosecution. A wide range of people are responsible for identification potentially troublesome young people: the police, teachers, religious leaders, youth clubs, neighbors (Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 2011).

In general the Norwegian anti-radicalization strategy features the following principles: focus not on punishment but on rehabilitation; fight against radicalization based on secular organizations' activities (the police, university, school, religious organizations, public organizations); the acceptance of values of the host-country by immigrants; establishment and maintenance of contacts and cooperation with Norwegian Islamic organizations; decisive role of the police in all the described processes. Such principles can be integrated quiet well into Russian anti-extremist structures. These structures need to work more actively with educational and public structures.

In the middle of 2010, schools in Norway saw the introduction of a program based on interaction of school administration and parents to fight radicalization both from the part of students and teachers. At the same time provisions were made for a comprehensive work to fight possible signs of extremism: Islamic religious extremism as well as racism and xenophobia manifestations aimed against Muslims (Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 2011).

Considering both achievements and faults in the previous programs (in particular, due to the need to improve work with immigrants) the Norwegian government developed the Action Plan which said that the Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Integration was instructed to introduce special courses that

help immigrants accept democratic society basic principles. They also explain to religious leaders coming to this country for permanent residence tolerance standards and Norwegian social policy (Vidino and Brandon, 2012). Such methods of working with religious leaders are also needed in Russia where there are cases when imams, for example, from Central Asia come to work in the country.

4. Monitoring extremist Internet activity. In the UK, according to the anti-terrorist legislation adopted in July 2015, schools and universities have to use special software that would monitor students' Internet activity including their correspondence in social networks detecting special terms that are used by terrorist recruiters (Taylor, 2015). Several companies (Securus, Future Digital, Impero) have already tested such software prototypes in a number of schools and they demonstrated good results (Taylor, 2015). An analysis of video and printed agitation extremist materials was carried out to draft a complete vocabulary of extremist terms that later became the basis for monitoring programs. Considering the importance of the role that the Internet plays in the recruitment of religious terrorists, monitoring the efficiency of such work is considered rather relevant.

Neutralization of prerequisites for recruitment, first of all through education, is even a more relevant problem connected with the prevention of recruitment. In this case, there are two basic approaches in the EU countries. The first one is to develop education aimed at implementation of European cultural values. The other one is to encourage the study of Islamic version that are against terrorism among Muslims.

3. Application of European experience in Russia

The IS fighters' terrorism propaganda is one of the key threats for Russia. There are many different problems that make young people and students join terrorist structures: spiritual crisis of modern society, social and economic problems and the problem of immigrants' integration into host communities, sophistication and efficiency of extremism and terrorist propaganda especially that of IS. The Russian Security Council, the National Anti-Terrorist Committee, anti-terrorist departments in the Federal Security Service and the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs in cooperation with an expert community are developing and refining a comprehensive model to fight recruitment and terrorist recruiters. The drafting of comprehensive educational and methodological guidelines for the police and intelligence services that analyze recruitment tools and ways to fight them as well as guidelines for schools and universities have become a relevant issue today. Mass distribution (especially among young people including online and in social networks) of special leaflets and other materials that unveil the most common psychological traps used by recruiters. Among them are, for instance, manipulating the ideas of fighting evil and other concepts of traditional religions, using of the idea of fighting corruption and injustice by recruiters, opposing moral degradation of modern society, searching the aim and sense of life. Work in this area is the most important element of counter-terrorism propaganda.

3.1. Role of state and society

State and society take an active stand in countering fighters' recruitment processes. State seeks to ensure a set of measures on efficient development of values and beliefs of young people in the country. State authorities and civil society institutions pay particular attention to the prevention of terrorist ideological influence on Russian youth and its recruitment to terrorist fighting units. In a wider sense it accounts for an extreme importance of Russian youth outlook development in general and students' outlook development in particular. This important provision is a must in a state policy. State has recently paid much attention to spiritual and moral education of Russian youth. The fifth (starting from the year 2000) state program of Russian citizens' patriotic education is being implemented right now (Government of the Russian Federation, 2015). A number of other legal and acts regulating the development and quality improvement of educational processes (Russian newspaper, 2009).

It is worth noticing that technology having a destructive impact on youth mass consciousness has been fine-tuned during various anti-governmental rallies, proved to be "efficient" and was actually phased in by the Islamic State terrorist organization recruiters. It predetermined the prospects of IS constant replenishment. It will be impossible to change this situation only with prohibitive measures. As student recruitment is a systematical, comprehensive and networking process, then countering measures also need to be of systematic, comprehensive and networking nature. Official announcements and publications in the mass media are not sufficient to prevent propaganda of the IS ideology attractiveness.

Table 1. Approach to state anti-terrorism policy

Questions	Agree, %	Disagree, %	Cannot say, %
The IS is a direct threat to Russia	64,4	20,4	15,1
All possible means can be employed to fight IS (including illegal ones)	61,3	23,6	15,1
Persons departed to IS need to be deprived of citizenship and be banned from their country	59,6	26,2	14,2
Relatives of persons departed to IS need to be punished and penalized	21,3	64,4	14,2
The more global community fights IS, the stronger it becomes	22,9	53,8	23,3
Domestic fight with IS develops mistrust among peoples	43,8	36,0	20,2
The government is not able to prevent IS recruitment inside the country	31,8	47,6	20,7
State is responsible for people departing to fight for IS	24,4	56,2	19,3
People who voluntarly admitted having supported IS need to be forgiven	14,7	67,1	18,2
If left alone, IS will cease terror	8,0	82,4	9,6
Russia shouldn't have interfered in the war against IS	21,1	56,2	22,7
Dialogue and negotiations are an efficient strategy of interaction with IS	12,0	74,4	13,6
Fighters coming back from IS need to be rehabilitated and not prosecuted	11,3	78,1	10,6

Source: Authors' calculations based on own survey conducted on 17 September 2016.

It turned out that in terms of approach to various state and social measures countering radical and terrorist ideology, students are much more ready to agree with rigid anti-terrorist measures and the idea of terrorism being a national threat than with the need to use soft measures countering IS (Table 1). The idea of integrating fighters coming back from Syria was poorly supported. The idea of mitigating punishment for people who voluntarily admitted having supported IS was highly unpopular. As 64% of Russian students think that IS is a primary threat to national security, they find it reasonable to utilize the most rigid repressive measures against fighters and recruiters. Thus, the model of former fighters' social integration (following the Aarhus model) most likely won't be widely supported. At the same time, students think that terrorist threat inside the country fosters mistrust and suspicion regarding other peoples. It was also identified that around one quarter of students blame the state for highly efficient terrorist propaganda and terrorist attacks. Moreover, almost half of the students (47,6%) believe that the existing state measures aimed at recruitment prevention are rather efficient. More than half of the students (56%) fully support Russian anti-terrorist operation in Syria.

3.2. Role of education

Implementation of extremism prevention programs in the educational system. The content of academic curriculum needs to be adjusted correctly. Throughout a long period, up to the present moment the Russian educational system has been focused on meeting market needs by training single-subject specialists to the detriment of the spiritual and moral element. This is one of the main reasons motivating a certain part of students which is based on dependence and an aspiration towards achievement and consumption of benefits at any cost, even illegally. The experience of France in this sphere may be most productive as well as the experience of Germany and Austria which is a little bit less productive. The French program entitled "Big Mobilization of Education in Support of Republican Values" that is being implemented right now as well as discussions in the French Senate and in civic circles of additional provisions and adjustments to this program are of great interest for the Russian Ministry of Science and Education and other authorities.

Among discussed or already adopted measures that could be useful in the context of Russia are the following:

- Mass training of teachers-methodologists in counter-terrorist propaganda; introduction for this purpose of special courses and programs in pedagogical universities in collaboration with anti-extremist departments in the Ministry of Internal Affairs or anti-terrorist departments in the Federal Security Service;
- Further support and development of university and school mass media system dedicated to anti-terrorism effort and their interaction with national mass media and online portals;

- Development of research in radicalization and war on terror, increasing of scholar funding in these areas. In Russia it can be done through a system of scientific foundations;
- Distribution of guidelines with the indication of possible signs demonstrating youth involvement into radical terrorist and religious organizations as well as organization of methodological seminars on these subjects involving representatives of law enforcement agencies, scholars' and teachers' community;
- Telephone hotline that provides information on radicalization problems;
- Introduction of an educational course on critical perception of information in the Internet at schools and universities with a view to identify extremist content;
- Support of public organizations that promote accounts of former terrorists and religious radicals who have started a rehabilitation process;
- Introduction of counter-terrorist issues in school and university introductory courses to religious culture also in collaboration with Islamic religious figures;
- Support of Russian Islam, broadened access of Muslim religious figures to higher education in Russia;
- Development of program on the rehabilitation of extremist groups former members which demands the creation of individual tutors-phycologists' network.

Tuning-up special programs of interaction between educational institutions and the police. In this case, the most curious example is the idea of continuous cooperation of the police and society in the framework of the Norwegian program "The Exit". For instance, private conversations with experts are relevant, being an early measure that precedes prosecution. The most useful element of the program is identification of potentially troublesome youth by systematic and continuous cooperation of the police, professors, teachers, religious figures, youth clubs and local citizens. It would be reasonable to introduce courses in Russia that explain basics of a democratic society for arriving immigrants as well as focused work with religious leaders based on the analysis of, for example, Norwegian experience.

One should not forget that recruitment to a terrorist group is performed not only by propaganda of ethno-confessional extremist chimeras but also by promises of rapid wealth accumulation. There is no exact data on how much IS fighters earn but it's evident that their "salary" is mostly made up of robbery and looting which are hard to count. This is a rather efficient trap for those who seek quick wealth accumulation.

Amid dynamically developing social communication systems educational technology that was efficient 10 or even 5 years ago do not always have the expected result. That is why in the process of both the development of Russian youth outlook in general and countering the recruitment of students in particular, bureaucratization and inefficient technology have to be eliminated.

As for the content-related aspect regarding the prevention of student recruitment to IS, it envisages the implementation of the following measures:
- countering terrorist ideology with the help of universities' information resources;
- creation of organizational, legal, scientific, technical, professional, financial and other favorable conditions for efficient information prevention of student recruitment to IS terrorist structures;
- identification and forecast of potential recruitment areas among students, websites and accounts belonging to recruiters and implementation of measures to block them and prosecute providers who are responsible for their functioning;
- search and analysis of real-time information on terrorist recruiters' activities among students and their allies;
- development of students' vigilance, moral and psychological resilience, team spirit and personal responsibility;
- teaching student activists about forms and methods of work with students exposed to terrorist recruiters.

The most important condition to efficiently prevent student recruitment is the direct involvement of student representatives and activists in this process. Students exposed to recruiters will listen to no one but their peers who have friendly and trust relationship with them. A proactive stance of the Veterans' Council, academic staff, senior fellow students on covering real events in military-patriotic work will enhance students' immunity to recruitment technology.

Table 2. Idea of Islamic State

Questions	Agree, %	Disagree, %	Undecided, %
Religious fanaticism was the reason for the establishment of IS	60,0	25,3	14,7
Conflict of traditional and western cultures was the reason for the establishment of IS	36,4	36,2	27,3
Foreign intervention was the reason for the establishment of IS	36,0	41,1	22,9
Unjustified repressions of Syrian and Iraqi government were the main reason for the establishment of IS	26,0	45,1	28,9
IS is just a tool for the promotion of concerned countries' interests	30,7	43,1	26,2
IS pursues only political objectives	29,6	47,8	22,7
IS is based on terror and violence	70,7	16,2	13,1
IS has huge funds and modern arms	53,8	21,1	25,1
IS doesn't respect women and minorities' rights	60,9	18,7	20,4
IS is a new form of the state	16,2	66,0	17,8
IS is a political "brand"	24,0	56,0	20,0
IS is a temporary phenomenon	38,7	37,6	23,8
IS is the lesser of two evils in the Middle East	9,8	72,2	18,0
IS provides its followers with social guarantees which they can't receive in their own country	18,0	66,0	16,0
IS seeks to create a unified national environment and provide equal opportunities for foreigners and locals	10,4	73,1	16,4
It is easier for locals to live in IS than under the reign of the	8,9	75,8	15,3

Questions	Agree, %	Disagree, %	Undecided, %
official Syrian and Iraqi government			
IS fights for the establishment of the fair world for people of the same faith	16,7	65,1	18,2

Source: Authors' calculations based on own survey conducted on 17 September 2016.

It is worth noticing that students don't share the idea of IS as a full-scale state or a similar organization that provides its members with social guarantees (Table 2). So, according to the majority of the respondents, IS is based on violence and fanaticism. At the same time only around one quarter of student believe that this terrorist organization appeared as a result of internal controversies and the situation in the countries of this region. While around 36% of students think that the reason for IS establishment were some sort of external factors.

3.3. Anti-recruitment information campaign

Information countermeasures to prevent terrorist recruitment suggest the implementation of a number of measures both offensive and protective. Passive information countering includes identification, localization and ban of information accounts in other resources of student terrorist recruitment. This operational area needs to be implemented in cooperation with state authorities' representatives including units on anti-terrorism information campaign of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the National Counter Terrorism Committee as well as the Federal Service for Supervision in the Sphere of Telecom, Information Technologies and Mass Communications.

Thus, the British experience in the development of special software for monitoring youth Internet-activity using key words utilized by terrorist recruiters is relevant for the Russian Security Council, the National Counter Terrorism Committee, the Federal Security Service and the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. Preliminary experience of this software functioning at schools and universities demonstrated positive results in terms of recruitment prevention.

As youth, especially students, belong to the major risk group, the main part of liability for counter-terrorism propaganda stays within the educational system and the mass media. Considering both the unique situation in Russia (Islam has been officially acknowledged as one of the traditional religions) and well-known problems connected with the introduction of multiculturalism elements in the life of European communities, a special model of counter-terrorism orientation in the system of higher and secondary education may be recommended for Russia. It can combine two main approaches developed in the EU countries, each of them having both advantages and disadvantages.

The first approach is the development of university and school curricula based on the French practices and aimed at the introduction of positive cultural values. When considering a unique nature of Russian culture in which, unlike the

French culture, a more significant role is attributed to traditional religious values, this experience should be applied to Russia, especially in regions that face serious challenges of immigrant integration. The second approach is to encourage Muslims to study those versions of Islam that oppose terrorism which corresponds to the British experience of fight with religious radicalization. These practices may be implemented in those Russian regions where Islam is traditionally significant for the society (Volga region and the North Caucasus). Such a differentiated approach will comply with federalism principles.

Table 3. Opinion on the role of the mass media in fight against terrorism and terrorist recruitment.

Questions	Agree, %	Disagree, %	Undecided, %
The mass media is an efficient tool to fight IS	16,0	67,1	16,9
The mass media informs people on risk connected with terrorism	61,1	22,2	16,7
The mass media stimulates interest to terrorists	43,1	46,7	10,2
The mass media encourages recruitment of new terrorists	9,2	66,7	24,1
The mass media exaggerates the power and terrorist threat coming from IS	18,4	56,9	24,7
The mass media distorts the image of IS and its followers	22,0	52,0	26,0
The mass media enhances the effect of terrorist attacks	34,7	43,1	22,2
The mass media stimulates the enhancement of repressive policy against IS followers inside the country	38,0	32,0	30,0
The mass media seeks to create the atmosphere of uncertainty and fear	34,4	41,8	23,8
Those who want to fight for IS need not be stopped	10,4	82,7	6,9
IS propaganda looks more interesting than the information from the official mass media	8,0	78,4	13,6
Communication with IS members (not for joining) will allow understanding their ideals and objectives better	28,0	56,9	15,1

Source: Authors' calculations based on own survey conducted on 17 September 2016.

In general, students believe the mass media plays a slightly positive role in fight against terrorism (Table 3). Despite the fact that many people consider the mass media as the most efficient tool to counter IS, the respondents highly appreciate the role of information sharing on terrorist threats. Part of the students see the mass media as a tool that reinforces the promotion and effect of IS terrorist attacks and at the same time demonizing terrorists and presenting them in a negative light. Thus, the mass media in students' perception doesn't have a definitive role that agrees with the research findings on the Italian middle class perception on terrorism (Sensalles *et al.,* 2013).

In general, unlike passive information campaigns, active campaigns are aimed at early identification and prevention of student recruitment to terrorist structures. Nevertheless, it's evident that this work should focus on creating a system of cultural and recreational work and youth creative development.

3.4. De-glorification of IS fighters

De-glorification of IS gang members and discrediting their romantic air is an important part of youth patriotic education for the prevention of IS recruitment. As long as terrorists are perceived by youth as people that are worthy of emulation, IS terrorist group will have a constantly replenished social basis. Discrediting these and similar myths will lead to decreasing efficiency of IS recruiters' activities.

Forced myths of romanticism need to be opposed with the real essence of participation in IS terrorist structures characterized by mercenariness, i.e. venality, that will be planted in students' minds. People recruited to this terrorist group should be perceived as mercenaries, "cannon fodder" used to reach criminal misanthropic objectives of IS leaders.

In the process of recruitment prevention worthlessness and nullity of people involved in IS structures should be highlighted. It should a priori make young people wonder: should they follow their example and their destiny? Photos and videos with imprisoned and destroyed IS fighters should also be released to public. Demonstrations of terrorists' hypocrisy should also be made public including such exemplary cases as an arrest of IS fighters who fled the battle field dressed in women's clothes (McFadyen, 2016).

Prevention of IS recruitment suggest the development of values determining that involvement in such criminal structures is not "cool" at all and not prestigious but instead – it should provoke disgust and rejection. As for de-glorification, it's evident that it will be reasonable to prepare a number of informative-analytic programs on day-to-day life of Russian citizens recruited by IS and currently being imprisoned for involvement in these terrorist groups. Inevitability of punishment for participation in this structure with further deterioration of personal image, social status and obstacles for career development and one's own wellbeing will definitely contribute to decreasing attractiveness of both IS itself and any kind of participation in its gangs' activities.

In general, the majority (around 70%) of students believe that terrorists are crazy psychopaths and dangerous religious fanatics (Table 4). A smaller number of students (around 25-40%) consider terrorists as mercenaries or losers who seek to find whatever reason in life. Positive connotations in terms of terrorists' perception received extremely insignificant support.

It is worth noticing that IS fighters' image is extremely demonized which is a little bit different from the reality. The most promising area of anti-terrorist mentality development would be to support the perception of terrorists as criminals, gangsters, mercenaries and, at the same time, confirmed losers whose aims are destined to fail.

Table 4. Perception of IS fighters' image

Questions	Agree, %	Disagree, %	Undecided, %
An IS terrorist is a crazy psychopath	68,2	18,4	13,3
An IS terrorist has no pity for civil citizens' sufferings and expresses hatred towards other people through his/her actions	76,4	13,6	10,0
An IS terrorist is a religious fanatic	70,9	17,1	12,0
An IS terrorist looks for accessible entertainment and thrill	24,2	54,0	21,8
An IS terrorist is a mercenary	32,9	48,2	18,9
An IS terrorist is a loser	37,1	43,3	19,6
IS terrorist suffers from the lack of future prospects	37,1	40,9	22,0
Young people in IS try to overcome their fear of life hardships and make life more sensible	33,8	45,8	20,4
A terrorist tries to attract attention of family and friends	20,4	63,1	16,4
An IS terrorist seeks how to avoid poverty and misery	24,9	58,0	17,1
An IS terrorist is a victim of deception and manipulation	45,1	33,6	21,3
An IS terrorist can be an educated person	55,1	25,8	19,1
An IS terrorist tries to live according to the commandments of his/her religion	29,3	52,2	18,4
An IS terrorist reacts to the feeling of injustice experienced by his/her people	22,9	57,8	19,3
An IS terrorist fights in order to liberate his/her nation	17,3	67,6	15,1
IS terrorist fights for his/her own freedom and ideals	30,7	52,0	17,3
An IS terrorist is a martyr accomplishing a rightful cause	6,7	85,6	7,8

Source: Authors' calculations based on own survey conducted on 17 September 2016.

Conclusion

Thus, it's obvious that youth patriotic education given the new need to proactively prevent student recruitment to terrorist structures demands that state, society and universities assume a serious approach. The solution of the indicated problems will contribute both to successful prevention of student recruitment to terrorist groups and, in general, their anti-terrorism activities. Considering the above mentioned problems, it is necessary to intensify information sharing on international terrorist fighters both through bilateral Russian-European cooperation and of intelligence services and through cooperation within the specified international structures. Mechanisms of international dialogue aimed at war on terror in connection with other security threats (drug trafficking, illegal immigration, money laundering) on the former USSR territory also need to be developed. This dialogue which needs to involve intelligence services, scholars-experts and civil representatives will contribute to the development of citizens' anti-terrorist consciousness which is indispensable in the war on terror. Public organizations as well as state structures need to be invited to carry out this work.

Wide implementation of anti-extremism and anti-recruitment measures in modern European society presents a challenge for the relevant structure in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and an expert community to monitor the results of programs adopted in Europe, develop measures for the adoption of these practices in Russia and ways of efficient international anti- terrorism cooperation

based on them. The improvement of cooperation with relevant structures within the EU, contacts with scientific and expert community, the development of humanitarian cooperation aimed at eradication of terrorism and religious extremism become extremely relevant in this regard.

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