(RE)BUILDING THE EUROPEAN UNION’S INTERNATIONAL ROLE THROUGH HUMAN SECURITY STRATEGY IN THE AFTREMATHS OF THE EUROPEAN CRISIS

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Abstract: In a globalized world, characterized by profound shifts in the dynamics of global power and by diverse threats to peace and security, the European Union should be an active and peace-promoter actor, according to its founding principles. Thus, the European crisis left hard to heal scars within the European Union internal coherence and for its international role and image. The European crisis determined a cleavage in foreign and defence policy between the EU’s member states, creating dissonances in its internal processes. Therefore, this incongruence determined flawed reactions to international events. In order to determine the impact of the European crisis on the EU’s international role, it is briefly analysed the EU’s and its member states reactions to the conflicts from Libya and Syria. The main hypothesis of this article is that in order to overcome the effects of the economic crisis and to rebuild its international trust, the EU should reaffirm its core principles through a coherent external policy, which should be embedded in a bottom-up legitimized paradigm. This analysis demonstrates that human security strategy and the responsibility to protect principle can become the new European meta-narrative, the fact that they have the potential to overcome the current gap between rhetoric and practice in foreign and defence European policies. Therefore, this article advocates that the human security strategy and the responsibility to protect principle represent an impetus to transform the EU in an important global actor.

Keywords: European Union; human security; European crisis; responsibility to protect; Common Foreign and Security Policy; Libya; Syria

INTRODUCTION

The spillover effect of the effect of the economic European crisis in determined a natural propagation of the economic destabilization to the political level. The effects of the economic crisis determined a social crisis, followed by episodes of national protectionism and the questioning of the EU’s values. Consequently, a wave of protectionism for national economies and policies emerged, with a registered critical situation described by member states’ reluctant and non-cooperative attitudes, in the European foreign and defence policy. Member states adopted defensive positions, trying to reduce their external spending in order

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to protect their economies against the effects of the crisis. Therefore, they reduced their budgets and their willingness to participate in external actions both (bi/multi)unilateral and within a European conjugated action under the Common Foreign and Security Policy decreased. As a result, these facts contributed to the EU’s weak and incongruent response to international tensions, as the most important examples, the conflicts from Libya and Syria.

Apart from the negative impact, times of crisis could represent an opportunity for a restructuration and a reconstruction of the old systems of values, facts and realities. Therefore, on the ground of the European crisis on EU’s international role, it should be analysed its transformative assertive potential on rethinking its narratives, in order to rebuild the European international image and to build it as an important global actor.

In the global competition, with powerful global actors, which revive fast and durable their economies, the European Union should adopt a coherent foreign policy, based on legitimized internal principles, in order to increase its global visibility. As the European Commission’s President Barroso observed, the EU was (and, to date, we can affirm that it still is) characterized by a type of “fatigue” (Barroso 2013), a “last man” (Fukuyama 1992, xxi) type of syndrome, “with no desire to be recognized greater than others” (Fukuyama 1992, xxi). Therefore, this fact asks for the rethinking of the European basic narratives, in order to create a meta-narrative based on global-shared values, which could strengthen the new generation’s trust in the European values, and through transitivity, and to (re)build the EU’s global role.

This article demonstrates that the implementation of the human security paradigm and of its operationalization, the responsibility to protect principle, in the EU’s policies could be an integrative-reconciling solution, encompassing both the national and the individual level, to respond to the above described effects of the economic crisis and consequently to revive the EU’s international role. In this paper we approach the human security paradigm in a broad sense, as a horizontal shared value in the EU’s policies, over-passing the narrow crisis-response meaning. The first hypothesis is that the European economic crisis affected the European Common Foreign and Security Policy, therefore it had a negative impact on the international image of the EU. In order to test this hypothesis, a short analysis of the devised reaction of the EU and of its member states to the conflict from Libya and Syria is presented. The first section makes a short description of the effects of the crisis on the factors that determined a decline in EU’s international role and on the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The next part presents the EU’s and the member states’ reactions to the Libyan and Syrian conflicts. The following section tests the valences of human security, whereas the next part represents the analysis of the pre-crisis contact of the EU with the human security rhetoric. The final section argues the main hypothesis of the article, that the implementation of the human security strategy and of the responsibility to protect principle represents the palliative response to the European crisis effects on the EU’s international role and the incentive for the EU to become a major global actor.
In order to test the main hypothesis this research uses qualitative methods, by analyzing the existing literature in the field and the official documents related to the central concepts and strategies. This article represents an introductive research on the broad and vast causes and effects of European crisis and proposes non exhaustively one of the possible methods to revive the EU’s international role and to transform it in a global actor.


The global financial and economic crisis affected, in a spillover effect, the European Union dynamics on all its policies (Stracca 2013, 23). The prolonged crisis generated centrifugal forces that threatened the core existence of the EU’s values, from both top-down and bottom-up, which divided the unity between member states and distanced the European citizens from the EU values (Tocci and Faleg 2013, 1-3). The euro zone's sovereign debt crisis and the economic-social crisis, which has been propagated in Europe since 2008, slowed down the optimistic European incentives for further integration in policies of shared competence or in those of states’ exclusive competence. The EU and the member states focused mainly on economic issues, in order to create stability, reducing the importance of the European external agenda and neglecting the external security situations which needed their assistance. Together with the austerity measures adopted to overcome the effects of the economic crisis, a phenomenon of euro-scepticism and lack of trust in European values was registered. Therefore, there is an important part of EU’s citizens that believes that the European Union lacks accountability and an empathic, representative approach. Moreover, as a consequence of the austerity measures, the top-down decision making is highly criticized by citizens. In order to restore the legitimacy of the European project, there is an urgent need for greater unity, through a meta-narrative which is strong enough to regain the citizens’ trust and to provide the necessary framework for assuring peace and prosperity within and beyond Europe (Tocci and Faleg 2013, 6).

1.1. The effects of European crisis on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

The effects of the economic crisis, which was determined by the macroeconomic Eurozone model and by the failure of the national governments to implement this policy’s measures (Togati 2011, 99), influenced the EU’s internal dynamics, coherence and conducted to a relative stagnation of Europe. These consequences were visible internationally through the drawbacks in the implementation of the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) and of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and in the member states’ (lack of) reactions to global events which asked for action under these policies. The lack of conjugated reaction to international crises, as for example the Arab Spring turmoil in Libya and Syria caused distrust in the EU’s potential to assume a credible
international role. During the economic crisis, the European member states reduced their defence budget and discouraged their partners in engaging in new (potential expensive) defence or security common actions. These actions were concerning because they were built on a climate of protectionist and reluctant European engagement in politics of security and defence (Pertusot 2014, 4). Security and international priorities were increasingly defined nationally and the interest for domestic politics was revived. Between 2006 and 2012, the overall spending on defence in Europe has decreased by 26 billion euros, which represented the aggregating spending of the ten lowest defence spenders within the EU (Pertusot 2014, 4). The restraint defence budget limited the ability to develop and to sustain military capabilities, fact that jeopardized the sustainability of Europe’s defence and the EU’s international role (European Council 2013, p. 1).

Thus, the CFSP and CSDP are areas of the EU’s external action which encounter on a normal basis difficulty to be implemented, due to the procedure of unanimity in the decision making process, fact that can hold back the EU’s action, because of the member states’ national interests or geopolitical conjunctures (Blockmans 2013, 46). The Lisbon Treaty and the subsequent meetings organized in order to find a response to the international crises proved that there is an extensive need to develop a common European commitment to values and norms so that the present drawbacks on issues of security and defence could be overcome. Further steps were taken at the European Council in December 2013 were all the member states were asked to reconsider the meaning of defence for them and for Europe. The main pillars of discussion were conducted around the shared opinion that ”defence matters”, with focus on regional and international peace and stability in the context of the current dynamics of geopolitical environment (European Council 2013, p. 1). In order to reconstruct the EU’s international there is a correlated need for will and investment in External policy and in defence matters. The potential of EU stands in the “unique ability to combine, in a consistent manner, policies and tools ranging from diplomacy, security and defence to finance, trade, development and justice” (European Council 2013, p. 23). Therefore, the Council asked for further steps to be taken in order to reassure the EU’s strategic partners of the good will and of the European defence capabilities in order to re-establish the EU’s international role, but it was registered a prudent engagement of the member states and a discourse which does not overpassed the national interests, in comparison with the visionary and optimistic discourses in matters of defence registered before the beginning of crisis in Europe.

The European crisis’ effects were also visible in the lack of institutional coordination. The above presented causes, correlated with a well-known reluctance of states to renounce to their security and defence prerogatives and with a lack of European strategic planning determined a ”governance gap” that undermines the CSDP, visible in a decreasing of the CSDP deployments in four years after the official adaptation of the Lisbon Treaty, according to Faleg (2013, 2). Therefore, this conjuncture of factors, events and lack of will determined (along with other factors that not make the object of the present analysis) a depreciation of the EU’s
international role and increased the mistrust in the EU as being a security provider actor, for the world and for its own citizens.

1.2. The EU’s and the member states’ incoherent reactions to Libyan and Syrian conflict

This section presents the distinct reactions of the European Union as a coherent actor and of the member states to the similar conflicts from Libya and Syria. The current analysis is relevant for the main topic of this paper, demonstrating that there was registered a major incoherence between the actions of the European actors, fact that undermined the international image of EU as a security provider. The drawbacks of a unitary international role of the European Union are determined by the fact that member states have a „thwarted coherence” in the EU’s foreign action (Kempin 2014, 14). The reactions to the Libyan and the Syrian conflicts are edificatory to demonstrate the incompatibility with the EU’s High Representative position in this type of matters and the lack of coherence among the EU’s member states in questions of external action.

The wave of uprisings for liberalization and freedom began in Tunisia at the end of 2011, spreading in a domino effect on Yemen, continuing with Bahrain, Libya, Syria and Egypt. The European Union was, as the entire world, surprised by this unpredicted wave of turmoil in these fundamentalist, apparently impenetrable states. The conflicts from Libya and from Syria shared the same pattern to a certain point: both were protest started against the undemocratic leader, which burst into civil war. Although the situation on the ground and the number of casualties was comparable, what lacked for a similar reaction of the international community under the responsibility to protect principle were the geo-political interests. While in Libya the Resolution 1973 permitted to a French lead international coalition to intervene under the auspices of R2P, Syria faces to moment, three years of civil war with daily civil victims, because international community is reluctant to intervene under the R2P principle. Syria is a diplomatic minefield between those that want to activate under R2P and those that prefer a natural internal resolution of Syrian conflict, demonstrating that the international community uses double standards in implementing its ruling principles. This non-sense situation presents a real test for international community, including the EU as a coherent actor or a global actor.

There was a tremendous difference between the response of the individual European Union’s member states and the EU’s reaction to the Arab Spring (European Union Center of North Carolina 2012). The EU’s failure to react to the violent events of the Arab Spring, which were situations that asked for intervention under the R2P principle, was determined by the fact that its defence policy never materialized in realistic action, because of the internal dichotomy between the member states’ will and the path of action described by CFSP and CSDP. Furthermore, the EU was unable to understand the internal conditions of instability form Libya and Syria and was paralyzed by the unanimity procedure in taking actions in CSFP, therefore this is the source of criticism for its ”deafening silence”.

Although in Libya’s case the European Union had some initiatives to support freedom and democratization, in Syria’s case there were to date several declarations, without important commitments and very few implemented projects.

The Libyan conflict was the test of the CFSP and for the European Union External Action Service, which proved that the expectations after the Lisbon Treaty were unrealistic (Gottwald 2012, 5) and demonstrated the existence of a concerning gap between the European rhetoric and reality. Although at the declarative level the EU was active and expressed its concerning for the Libyan situation by condemning violence, in practice it was unable to act. The criticism for this incoherence came from both internal and external actors, blaming the EU’s defence impotence.

The intervention in Libya, justified by the Responsibility to Protect principle, was driven by France and the United Kingdom. France was pursuing its national interest in the region, being a regional leader in the Middle East and North Africa, but while it appeared as a driver of European action, it failed in its role of being a multilateral actor within the European Union. The Great Britain followed France in its initiative, due to its economic interest in the region. Germany, in a diplomatic blunder (Seibel 2012, 9), and lacking any economic interest in the region, expressed its refusal to participate to this kind of international conjugated action. Therefore, the EU member states were characterized by different “logics of security” and contradicted the official EU rhetoric of security (Gottwald 2012, 22).

The situation from Syria found no support along the implementation of the EU’s policies in European states, except France. The Great Britain and Germany presented reserves to be part in a further intervention deepening the opinion’s division within EU (Faleg 2013, 3). The member states’ reluctance to act under a common mission conducted by EU expressed the importance of their national interests and the possibility to step-back form a mission whenever greater risk is predicted. Therefore, the situations form Libya and Syria demonstrated that the EU is “politically and militarily impotent whenever a response to a major crisis is needed” (Faleg 2013, 3).

2. THE HUMAN SECURITY PARADIGM AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT PRINCIPLE AS POLITICAL LEITMOTIVS

Human security is defined in the paragraph 143 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome as “the right of all people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair” (UN General Assembly 2005). Its core elements are encompassed in the expression “freedom from fear and freedom from want” in the general background of human dignity. Human security is an integrative concept because it tries, based on a spirit of solidarity, to ensure the possibility to a participatory existence, in the spirit of human life and dignity (UNDP 1994, 22-3). UNDP identified in 1994 report the pillars of human security as being economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security. Therefore, the human security concept encompasses the interdependence between security, governance and politics, as
well as social and economic development (Beebe and Kaldor 2010, 159). It is described as having the role to protect the vital core of human lives and the fulfilment of human being (Alkire 2004), while it has to be found a common pathway between global rights and national interests (Axworthy 2004). Acharya sustains that human security is a “holistic paradigm which offers opportunities for creative synthesis” giving credits for new international actors and global civil society (Acharya 2004). Thus, due to its loose and general definition, human security is a controversial concept, being accused that it is a justification for the international actors’ hidden, malicious interests. Therefore, there is a need for a threshold approach in implementing this strategy, even if it is implemented as a horizontal roadmap for other policies. This analysis adopts the broadest sense of human security paradigm, transforming it in a common, integrative pattern for other policies. Sira and Grans (2009, 7) observed that human security strategy is the response to three changes in international relations in the post-cold-war area, namely the new and large variety of threats to security, a change and development of global norms and the effects of globalization. The importance of the human security strategy is highlighted in the new global context due to a translation of the security referent, from state, towards the individual, simultaneous with a change of the traditional concept of sovereignty towards the concept of sovereignty as responsibility.

This change of paradigm was translated in practice through the responsibility to protect principle, which was elaborated in 2001 by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) on three pillars: (i) state responsibility implies protection responsibilities, (ii) every state has the primary responsibility to protect the people on its territory, and (iii) the international community has a residual responsibility to step in if states are unable or unwilling to protect the people on their territory (ICISS, 2001). The report reaffirmed the role of the state as the principal actor of international relations, but draw „the hitherto dormant link between state’s national security and the security of individuals within the state” (Simon 2008, 46). The foundations of the responsibility to protect, as a guiding principle for the international community, lie in its specific legal obligations under the human rights and the human protection declarations, covenants and treaties, international humanitarian law and national law. The responsibility to protect principle was unanimously adopted by UN member states at the 2005 World Summit, which validated the idea that states had the responsibility to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (Bellamy and Williams 2011, 827), and in the same time that states share the responsibility for the security of individuals, no matter within which boundaries they live. The quintessence of the responsibility to protect principle is encompassed on its dimensions of “responsibility to react”, “responsibility to prevent” and “responsibility to rebuild” (ICISS 2001, 17), which creates a more comprehensive view of the human security strategy operationalization. Therefore, R2P and human security represented, in the first two decades after the End of the Cold War a paradigmatic change that declared a new global politics cantered on the individual. The international following crises slowed
down this impetus due to the international community’s reluctance to adopt these norms. The successes and the potential evolution towards global peace and democracy of the human security rhetoric are demonstrated by its recurrent presence in the restructuring the international positions discourses.

Human security strategy was used in general related to situations of threat for human lives. The present article proposes a normative perspective of human security strategy, as having the potential to become a permanent state of fact, the leitmotiv and background for peace and security and which could empower the EU to increase its internal coherence and to become an important global power. Therefore, this paradigm, interpreted in terms of care and security for individuals regardless their nationality, and is derived from a pure form of democracy (which goes beyond the current meaning of democracy, towards cosmopolitan democracy) can be the meta-narrative that could revive the EU’s internal coherence, legitimacy in front of its citizens and could re-create the EU’s international role, transforming it in a global actor.

2.1. The EU before crisis: steps towards the implementation of the human security strategy

The first attempts for the implementation of the human security strategy within the EU’s security area were the European Security Strategy in 2003 and The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities- A Human Security Doctrine for Europe. The last mentioned document highlights the importance of the bottom-up approach in achieving human security and draws the pillars of the implementation of the human security strategy within EU on seven principles: the primacy of human rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, a bottom-up approach, regional focus, the use of legal instruments, and the appropriate use of force (Solana 2004, 2). Although these initiatives had no real success the human security paradigm started to be included in the European projects of conflict prevention, crisis management and Civil–military coordination (Kaldor, Martin and Selchow, Human security: a new strategic narrative for Europe 2007, 274-7).

The Barcelona report created a three-dimensional argumentation for the EU to adopt the human security strategy. Morality, legality and the “enlighten self-interest” create, in a new window of opportunity for Europe, the pillars which draw the road to the revival of its international role. The EU has a moral obligation generated by its founding principles – peace, security, prosperity – to assure the security of its citizens, and consequently to the every individual human being. A general commitment to a broad definition of human security was embedded in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union, which aimed at strengthening the international security, the consolidation and support of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law (Gottwald 2012, 13). Moreover, EU has the legal impetus to adopt the human security strategy, under the Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter and The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Solana 2004, 10). The motivation of the enlightened self-interest to
adopt human security is generated by the mutual global vulnerability, which means that European citizens cannot enjoy security while others are endangered, due to the possible contagion process and of secondary effects (immigrant flows, terrorist acts, and economic instability). This pro-active broadening perspective of security could overpass the narrow practice of the European international affairs policies of aiming to defend the borders, by the human security strategy, which would be meaning to export the EU’s functioning model and to assure security outside its borders. These facts would re-create the European internal coherence and therefore would exponentially increase the EU’s international role, transforming it in a global peace-provider actor.

The Madrid Report of the Human Security Study Group from 2007 “A European Way of Security” created further incentives for the implementation of the human security strategy within the EU policies (Gottwald 2012, 14). The 2007 Madrid report was highly compatible with the main thesis of this article, which sustains that for becoming a global actor, the EU “needs to give clear political direction to its ambitions and responsibilities on the world stage”. This fact is possible through the implementation of human security strategy within the CSDP, due to its potential to operate “as a dynamic organizing frame, which could give new direction and coherence to European efforts to address the challenges set out in the European Security Strategy” (Human Security Study Group 2007, 3). Furthermore, the report called for conjugated action based on coherence, effectiveness and visibility in order to create a “European way of security” and for a bottom-up implementation of this strategy in order to create genuine rooted values.

The 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS (European Security Strategy) created the incentives for the inclusion of R2P rhetoric within the European security strategy and called for member states to embrace this paradigm because they “hold a shared responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” (European Council 2008).

Thus, as the section I.2. presents, the EU failed in implementing the human security strategy and the responsibility to protect principles. A possible explanation for the failure of the EU and of the member states to adopt the recommendations of the reports on human security can be found in the effects of the European crisis. Hence, we cannot affirm that there is a direct relation between the European crisis and the EU’s and member states’ reluctance to react to international events, due to the well-known national protectionist measures for security and defence policies and the geo-political national interest, but we can assume that the oscillation in the implementation of CSFP was a response to the effects of the economic crisis.

### 2.2. (Re)building the EU’s international role through the implementation of the human security paradigm

The EU has passed through a developing process of the security concept, which was correlated simultaneously to the internal and external events, fact that determined a security approach that overcomes the classical divide between the
issues of external and internal security (Sira and Grans 2009, 4). On this background flourished the idea that the EU can reaffirm its international role, or to create its global role, thorough the human security strategy. Therefore, in order to reconstruct the EU’s international role and to strengthen its internal coherence and trust, a common dominator which can encompass the European citizens’ and member states’ shared values and practices is needed. The human security paradigm adopted in its broad meaning, as a horizontal set of values, appears to be a solution which could encompass the above mentioned EU’s internal and international deficiencies. The human security strategy is highly compatible with the core ideas of the CFSP and CSDP because it encompasses conflict prevention, crisis management and civil–military cooperation and in the same time describes the principles for applying these policies (Kaldor, Martin and Selchow 2007, 283). Moreover, the human security strategy has the necessary strength, embedded in humanitarian assistance and civil protection dimension, to reduce the current gap of governance within CSDP and between expectations and capabilities (Gottwald 2012, 24).

As Gottwald (2012, 6) observes, the EU perceives the CFSP as having the responsibility to act externally when is the case, it is focused on the “people” of Europe, which means the primary concern for the individual’s security. Moreover, the EU is strongly correlated with the UN decisions regarding actions of the R2P principle. Therefore, EU has the potential to act under the R2P doctrine, fact that would increase its global notoriety as a security and peace provider. Falefg (2013) proposes the implementation of a set of principles, described of similarity, solidarity and trust, clarity and unity within the EU policies, in order to overcome the current gap in the CSDP and CFSP. Therefore, this proposed solution, which aims to protect the individual by a common commitment of the member states in a sustainable, fair and good-will alliance, creates the necessary framework to overcome the current gap in the European security policy and therefore, it can reconstruct the EU’s international role and build its global status. The compatibility between the human security strategy and the EU’s will to rebuild its international role is expressed by the European Council’s call for a reaction to global environment, by horizontal issues between internal and external security dimension in areas of CSDP and Freedom/Security/Justice (European Council 2013, p. 4), all of them regarding as the main referent, the individual.

A strong argument for the proposed hypothesis, that the EU’s international role can be reaffirmed through the implementation of the human security strategy is that this paradigm becomes a meta-narrative of the EU, therefore it would be embraced simultaneously by the EU’s officials, strategies, member states, but most important, by the European citizens. This mechanism means that it would be created bottom-up approaches for human security, for a climate of peace and solidarity, through civil society initiatives, within member states and with neighbouring countries, once the human security paradigm is adopted as a general leitmotiv. The implementation of human security strategy is a self-enforcing type of phenomenon, because it would create a top-down pressure for further implementation and for its extension within and beyond EU’s borders (Solana
This two-way relation represents the strength of the human security strategy as a pillar of the construction of the EU’s international role.

The impetus of the implementation of human security strategy was reduced once the European agenda was flooded with the Euro-crisis issues. This strategy and the matters of CFSP were neglected as the member states focused their attention and budgets to their national economy that were threatened by economic, societal and political instability. Therefore, this could be an explanation for the failure to react properly to the conflicts from Libya and Syria, fact that affected its international reputation as a security provider and consequently its international role.

We can assume that the present moment, when the EU is almost recovered from crisis, is the most fertile moment to seed the ideas of human security and responsibility to protect in it strategies, so it can reborn both internally, through a greater legitimacy and coherence and internationally, as an important global peace and security provider actor.

CONCLUSIONS

The positive impact of the implementation of the human security strategy on the EU’s policies consists in the coherence that it would assure to the European actions, through member states and for institutional concepts because it is an umbrella strategy which can be implemented in all the European policies and practices. Moreover, the added-value of the human security paradigm for the EU consists in the facilitation of a solid ground legitimization among the European citizens.

The impact of the reports on human security launched before the crisis was weak and almost neglected, as presented in the previous sections regarding the EU’s reaction to the conflicts from Libya and Syria. The visible, undoubtedly incapability of the EU to respond coherently to international crisis under CFSP and CSDP, combined with a wave of euro-scepticism along Europe, determined a great depreciation of the EU’s international role and of its credibility as an international actor. The double standard reaction to international situations under the incentives of R2P and the lack of internal coherence for the CSDP damaged the EU’s international image and credibility and presented it as a weak, powerless actor. Therefore, there is an urgent need to compensate these drawbacks of the European project through a strategy that can overcome these destabilization phenomena. This paper demonstrated that by implementing the human security normative paradigm, correlated with its operationalization, the R2P principle, the EU can reconstruct its internal coherence through a new meta-narrative that encompasses the values of the European citizens and can, through a fresh incentive, to reconstruct the EU international role.

The elaboration of a conjugated strategy which would encompass the common European values, the synthesis of national interests and the core values of the European citizens through cooperation could create the conjuncture for the EU’s international role reaffirmation. In order to encourage the EU’s member
states to contribute in the defence policy there should be a continuity of strategic operations and engagement with the NATO and other partners, while creating the background European environment on a bottom-up basis and through a institutional reform that could sustain the reconstruction of EU’s international role and credibility. The urgency of these tasks comes simultaneously from the hard to rebuild international credibility and reputation, and foremost, from the tensioned situation from Ukraine to which EU was incapable to respond firmly and coherently. (Pertusot 2014, 7).

Further research should analyse the attitudes of the EU’s officials and of the member states’ towards human security and R2P, and the EU’s capabilities to sustain such strategies, in the context of the new international conjuncture.

Therefore, as the European crisis fades away, there is an imperative need to address the possible solutions to rebuild the EU’s international role. The human security broad strategy has the necessary theoretical force and grounded roots in the values of the worldwide individuals in order to become the pathway towards a global vocation of the European Union. The EU has the potential and the responsibility to act as a peace and security provider actor in the multipolar world, fact possible through the implementation of the human security strategy, which creates the premises of a legitimated EU transformed in a global power.

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